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FRUITS OF THE "IMPENETRABLE JUNGLE":
NAVIGATING THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN LAND-USE PLANNING
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 1994, America's local governments, financially
strapped' and already subject to potential liability in a number of areas,2
* Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond. Jay Taylor and Jo Lynn
White provided critical research assistance, and participants in law faculty colloquia at the
University of Richmond and American University, where I served as Visiting Professor
during the 1993-1994 academic year, offered uninhibited feedback. At the initial stages
of this project, Charles Haar, Joe Sax, and Clare Dalton shared some helpful insights; the
criticisms of Hamilton Bryson, Joel Eisen, Mary Heen, J.P. Jones, and Paul Zwier helped
sharpen earlier drafts. I am most grateful.
1. "In 1992 ... 65.2% of urban counties received lower own-source revenues than
expected, 51.5% received less intergovernmental aid than expected, and 51.5% ended up
with higher-than-expected expenditures." Kenneth J. Drexler, The Four Causes of the
State and Local Budget Crisis and Proposed Solutions, 26 URB. LAW. 563, 565 n.16
(1994) (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES (NACo), URBAN COUNTY FISCAL
SURVEY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FISCAL HEALTH OF 66 OF THE NATION'S LARGEST
COUNTIES (Feb. 1993)). See also ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBA&EZ,
REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 23-32
(1993) (discussing impact on local governments of "Stagnating Incomes and the Tax
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received an unwelcome gift from the United States Supreme
Court-Dolan v. City of Tigard.' For the third time in seven years,4 the
Justices ended their term by releasing an opinion further extending the
reach of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.5 This decision was a
cause for celebration in the ranks of private property champions6 and
Revolt," "Cutbacks in Federal Aid," "Infrastructure Backlogs," and "Federal and State
Mandates").
2. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating
affirmative action program for minority business enterprises under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)
(holding discharge of county employee was unlawful because of violation of First
Amendment free speech rights); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (requiring compensation under tile Fifth
Amendment for temporary and permanent regulatory takings); Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (refusing to extend state immunity from
federal antitrust laws to "home-rule" municipality); Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding municipality liable for constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)); Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
deniedsub nom. Kansas City Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987) (ordering school
district to share costs of school desegregation plan with state); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (holding that municipality can be liable for torts of
police officers under the doctrine of respondent superior).
3. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
4. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & William Mellor, Reining in the Land-Use Planners,
CH. TRIB., July 22, 1994, at 23 (noting that Dolan "signalled an end to the garden-variety
extortion that passes for land-use planning in many municipalities today"); Linda
Greenhouse, High Court, in a 5-4 Split, Limits Power on Private Property, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1994, at 1 (recognizing that Institute of Justice general counsel William H. Mellor
III labels Dolan "a 'dramatic victory' [whose] importance lay in the Court's recognition
that the ends can no longer justify the means in the regulation of land use"); Paul D.
Kamenar, A Quest for an Invigorated Takings Clause, THE RECORDER, Aug. 26, 1994, at
7 (including opinion of Kamenar, executive legal director of Washington Legal
Foundation, who predicts that Dolan will "provide a new weapon to property owners
seeking development permits" and "may even be of help to property owners who wish to
re-open proceedings where unconstitutional exactions have been imposed"); Billy Tauzin,
"If You Take It, Pay for lt!", Something's Wrong When a Rat's Home Is More Important
than an American's Home, ROLL CALL, July 25, 1994 (providing opinion of Tauzin, then
a Democrat from Louisiana who is a leading opponent of environmental regulation in the
House of Representatives, who hails Dolan as "a huge victory for all landowners"). The
Washington Legal Foundation and the Institute of Justice were joined by several other
organizations as amici curiae in support of Mrs. Dolan, including the Pacific Legal
Foundation, the National Association of Home Builders, the Mountain States Legal
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consternation among Court critics who perceive a return to the bad old
days of substantive due process,7 the Court's second-guessing of
government decisionmaking, this time in the fields of land-use planning
and environmental regulation.
Five Members of the Court, led by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
gave a sympathetic ear to Florence Dolan's assertion that the decision by
the City of Tigard, Oregon to condition approval of the plans to expand
her plumbing and electric supply store on the dedication of part of the
parcel for the purposes of flood control and traffic improvements
amounted to an uncompensated taking! In the process of redressing this
possible9 constitutional violation, the majority cautioned Tigard and
other municipalities that conditioning development permission on the
dedication of real property interests 0 was a serious proposition that
required (1) the existence of an "essential nexus" between a "legitimate
state interest" and the permit condition," and (2) a demonstration by
Foundation, the National Association of Realtors, to name but a few.
7. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting John Echeverria, Audubon Society
general counsel: "This is an extraordinary intrusion by the Court into the authority of
local government .... [that] elevates the interests of property owners over the interests
of the community as a whole"); Frank Shafroth, Cities Lose Takings Case in Dolan v. City
of Tigard, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, July 4, 1994, at I (predicting that Dolan "could lead
to a significant increase in federal court intrusion into municipal land use planning and
development"); Arlene Zarembka, A Green Light to Ignore the Environment, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, July 14, 1994, at 7B (noting that Dolan "gives property owners the green
light to develop with scant concern for the impact on the urban environment. In many
cases, it will become prohibitively expensive for government to regulate land use in the
public interest").
Joining the National Audubon Society and the National League of Cities as amici curiae
in support of the City of Tigard were, among others, the State of Oregon, the City of New
York, the United States, 1000 Friends of Oregon, the American Planning Association, the
National Trust for Historic Preservation, the National Association of Counties, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, and the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers.
See also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even more consequential
than its incorrect disposition of this case, however, is the Court's resurrection of a species
of substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago.").
8. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312.
9. The case was remanded to state court for a determination as to whether the city met
the rough proportionality standard. Id. at 2322.
10. In Dolan, the landowner was asked to dedicate not fee simple interests but a
"floodway easement" (also referred to as a "recreational easement") and a "pedestri-
an/bicycle pathway easement." Id. at 2320-21.
11. Id. at 2317 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987)).
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
8 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
the regulatory body of "rough proportionality," that is, an "individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development."' 2 In other words,
the extreme deference usually accorded to regulators of social and
economic activities 3 is not appropriate when private real property
exactions are part of the bargain.
Standing alone, the majority's holding in Dolan would not warrant
extreme concern by localities that currently include subdivision exactions,
impact fees, conditional rezoning, incentive zoning, and inclusionary
zoning as part of their land-use arsenal. Indeed, most American
cities-many operating under state law mandates'--already take care
to ensure that direct links exist between the concessions requested of the
property owner and the impact of the planned development. 5 However,
when viewed in the context of the Court's most recent pronunciamentos
in the regulatory takings area, Dolan appears to be part of a significant
shift away from the deference traditionally accorded land-use regulators
in the past and to presage even further assaults upon government
attempts to balance private property rights and the public welfare.
Indeed, Dolan surfaced while courts, commentators, and advocates were
still wrestling with the effect and implications of the Justices' most
12. Id. at 2319-20.
13. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7, at 582
(2d ed. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court will "sustain regulation in the socioeconomic
sphere if any state of facts either known or reasonably inferable afforded support for
the legislative judgment," and that the Court is "willing to resort to purely hypothetical
facts and reasons to uphold legislation").
14. See, e.g., Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26
URB. LAW. 541, 560-61 (1994) ("[N]ineteen states representing roughly half of the United
States population have adopted development impact fee enabling legislation . . . ."). See
also ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAR Z, supra note 1, at 53 ("In general, it is developers who
have taken the lead in pursuing legislation-primarily to secure state protection against
new local practices that they find threatening.").
15. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 561. Nelson notes that state enabling laws
explicitly, or in certain other words, require that new development not be assessed
more than its proportionate share of the cost of new or expanded facilities needed to
accommodate the development based on level of service standards, service area
analysis, and an analysis of land-use and facility needs over a planning horizon.
Id. The wide range of devices utilized by local governments is analyzed in Gus Bauman
& William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American
Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1987); and John J. Delaney et al., 7Tne Needs-
Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees
and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1987).
[Vol. 50:5
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recent takings offerings.
The primary architect of this shift is Associate Justice Antonin
Scalia who, on the last day of the 1991-1992 Term, five years after
shocking land-use and constitutional commentators with his
Lochnerian 6 opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,17
delivered the second part of his one-two punch to "traditional" takings
clause analysis. The topographical and regulatory setting for Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council" was a perfect match for Nollan: Both
cases involved the (il)legitimacy of state commission controls on real
estate development in the coastal zone, under the aegis of the federal
Coastal Zone Management Act. 9 The outcomes of the two cases were
a perfect match as well-both resulted in victories for the landowners in
their struggle against an environmentally directed state agency.2"
That a majority of the Rehnquist Court would render yet another
ecologically unfriendly decision in the area of coastal regulation was not
unexpected.2 The novel "categorical" 2 framework that Justice Scalia
employs for resolving this conflict (and it is to be supposed, future
conflicts) between environmental protection and private property rights
is somewhat surprising, even given Scalia's reputation for innovation and
unorthodoxy.23 Just when judges, lawyers, and commentators had
16. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision, and the Supreme
Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence in First
English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 427 (1988).
17. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
18. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
19. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) §§ 302-318, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-
1464 (1988) (cited in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 846-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2889).
20. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (state required to pay compensation for easement
across Nollans' property); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02 (state required to show principles
of nuisance and property law that prohibit landowner's intended uses of property).
21. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Is The Rehnquist Court Really That Conservative?:
An Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 987, 987, 992 (arguing that in
areas including the environment the Rehnquist Court "consistently accepts and endorses
conservative views," and that "the Endangered Species Act, wetlands preservation laws,
and coastal protection laws might be vulnerable after Lucas").
22. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. See also Michael Allan Wolf, Takings Term 11: New
Tools for Attacking and Defending Environmental and Land-Use Regulation, 13 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 469, 477-80 (1993).
23. See William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393
(1993). Professor Fisher writes:
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reconciled themselves to the give-and-take of an ad hoc regime for
resolving regulatory takings puzzles,24 Justice Scalia introduced a new
variety of per se violations.2"
Critics of federal takings jurisprudence who often bemoan the
absence of bright lines and functional tests26 had reason, at first glance,
to embrace Scalia's approach to cases where the plaintiff alleged total
deprivation attributable to government action. However, such delight
lasted only until they discovered the two fundamental ambiguities that
promise to bedevil the interpretation and application of the Court's new
formula.
The first element of uncertainty involves the determination whether
the complaining party indeed has suffered a total deprivation at the hands
[Scalia] surely has a strong set of political inclinations, most of which could be
described as libertarian. But those inclinations are not connected to a stable
constitutional theory. Instead, Justice Scalia selects from a large and eclectic set of
constitutional principles those that best suit his purposes in a given case. If the
principles he employs in one case prove inconvenient in the next, he casually
abandons them. The result is that, although it is usually easy to predict how he will
vote in a constitutional case, it is often difficult to predict how he will justify his
vote.
Id. at 1394. See also Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1583 (1991).
24. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1089 (1993) (bemoaning
the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978), and stating that "the Court... forswore the pursuit of general principles to
resolve takings cases and held that judges must instead engage in 'essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries"').
25. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
26. See, e.g., Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv.
1393, 1400 (1991) ("According to one view, the Court should seek to develop a unified
theory that would enable it to distinguish rather predictably between takings requiring
compensation and mere regulations under the police power."). Professor Paul, id. at 1400
n.18, cites the following as examples of "scholars seeking a general solution to the takings
problem": RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A
Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); John A. Humbach,
A Unifying Theoryfor the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use,
34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles: Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL.
L. REv. 1299 (1989); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles: Part I-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral
Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
[Vol. 50:5
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of the government." In fact, more than one Justice expressed doubt
that Lucas, the petitioner in the very case before the Court that gave rise
to the new test, retained no value in his property once the new coastal
regime was implemented.28 If those suffering under confiscatory
statutes, ordinances, or regulations can still salvage even a small amount
of value, the Lucas test will not apply. This was the lesson learned, for
example, by the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church when the
Justices remanded the case to a state court that sifted through the facts
to find some remaining value.29
The second area of ambiguity concerns Justice Scalia's evocation of
common-law nuisance as a way for the governmental unit responsible for
the offending regulation to justify (and thereby avoid financial responsi-
bility for) the total deprivation."0 Just as Rehnquist's opinion in Dolan
contemplated the validity of real property dedications for floodplain
protection and traffic control, the essence of Lucas lies in this intersec-
tion of common-law and regulatory land-use controls. The exploration
of that critical, outcome-determinative intersection, within the framework
of the dispute before the court and within a wider context of decades of
American land-use planning jurisprudence, is the central concern of this
Article.
Dolan and Lucas provide a contemporary lens through which we
can revisit some key land-use and environmental regulation cases,
decisions that also challenged jurists to reconcile private and public law
approaches to the basic problem of governmental controls over real estate
and natural resource development. As we rethink the narrative formed
by these by-now familiar fact patterns and opinions, a pervasive, though
somewhat hidden, theme emerges: the links between our centuries-old
methods for reconciling discordant uses-private and public nui-
sance-and their modem, regulatory legacies-local land-use regulation
and comprehensive federal and state environmental law-are undeniable
and persistent. To the informed jurist, these links provide insights for
27. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 ("The trial court found Lucas's two beachfront
lots to have been rendered valueless by respondent's enforcement of the coastal-zone
construction ban.").
28. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding ordinance did not preclude all uses of property),
on remandfrom 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
30. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
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understanding and resolving contemporary disputes and, perhaps, for
harmonizing some of the cacophony of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
Parts II and III of this Article discuss the more salient attributes of
the Court's most recent contributions to the regulatory takings dialogue,
with particular emphasis on Rehnquist's curious excursion into state law
to establish the Dolan standard of review, and Scalia's skillful weaving
of nuisance law into the fabric of the Lucas holding. Thus is the stage
set for the backward glances that follow.
Part IV reconsiders Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3 as the
case that forged the integral links between private nuisance law and its
"civil" legacy: local land--use controls, chiefly the height, area, and use
regulation we now call "Euclidean zoning."32 Viewed as the logical,
progressive extension of the common law's protection of neighbors'
rights to use and enjoy their real property, locally controlled zon-
ing-though entitled to great deference (one of Euclid's basic proposi-
tions)-is still subject to judicial veto if the court perceives either
confiscation33 or irrationality. 4 Zoning is thus legitimated and insulat-
ed from routine challenges because it seeks to protect the same values as
private nuisance, and not because it is a logical extension of the quasi-
criminal protections afforded the targeting of generally harmful activities
that we associate with public nuisance.
31. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. See, e.g., Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County, 662 P.2d 816, 819
(Wash. 1983) ("We are aware of the growing disenchantment with traditional 'euclidean'
zoning philosophy and practices under which a municipality is divided into different types
of zoning districts, each of which is assigned particular uses."); Amcon Corp. v. City of
Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 72-73 n.5 (Minn. 1984) ("The term 'Euclidean' zoning is taken
from the landmark United States Supreme Court case of [Euclid], in which zoning was
first sustained as a constitutional exercise of the police power. The zoning plan upheld
in Euclid contemplated, rather than case-by-case zoning, cumulative uses in a pyramid-type
configuration.') (citation omitted). See also PETER W. SALSICH, JR., LAND USE
REGULATION § 9.01 n.1 (1991) ("Euclidean zoning refers to a particular type of land use
control characterized by a 'cookie cutter' pattern of rigid, rectangular districts that was
upheld [in Euclid]:') (citation omitted).
33. See, e.g., Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517, 521
(N.Y. 1954) ("IT]he validity of the ordinance is assumed but that does not operate to
confer validity if, in fact, as here, the zoning ordinance is clearly confiscatory.").
34. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448
(1985) ("Because in our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing
that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests,
we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this
case.").
[Vol. 50:5
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Part V revisits Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel" and Fasano v. Board of Commissioners of Washington
County," two highly influential land-use cases that illustrate the limits
to the deference and tolerance exhibited by the Court in Euclid. The
New Jersey Supreme Court's refusal to indulge local government
officials' representations that large-lot zoning was environmentally based
involves a segregation of local land-use controls from environmental law,
thus accentuating the split of private from public nuisance. The Oregon
high court, concerned about the susceptibility of local land-use regulators
to undue pressure, employs substantive and procedural protections for
landowners who are negatively affected by planning and zoning
decisions.
Part VI centers on the Supreme Court's decision in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis,37 a holding that might appear
to be tenuous in the wake of more recent Court decisions, particularly
given the Dolan Court's narrow focus on the deprivation of the right to
exclude." Viewed from the perspective of the twin legacy of nuisance
law, however, the majority opinion in Keystone emerges as a
paradigmatic method for adjudging the validity of broad-based environ-
mental regulations that cause substantial, even total, deprivation.
Part VII concludes this Article with a warning. The Justices' efforts
to ratchet-up the level of scrutiny appropriate to takings challenges and
to reintroduce nuisance elements into the regulatory taking formula are
problematic, not only because of their potential chilling impact on well-
crafted regulations affecting private property,39 but also because they
could accelerate the pattern and practice of merging together traditional
land-use and modem environmental controls in judicial and legal
analysis. For several reasons, our responsibility for future cases entails
maintaining and using the twin legacy of nuisance (private and public)
35. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
36. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
37. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
38. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320-21. See also infra text accompanying notes 310-12.
39. See, e.g., Thomas G. Pelham, Innovative Growth Control Measures: The Potential
Impacts of Recent Federal Legislation and the Lucas Decision, 25 URB. LAW. 881, 881
(1993) (arguing that Lucas "may have a chilling effect on some state and local growth
management initiatives"); Terry D. Morgan, Exactions as Takings Tactics for Dealing with
Dolan, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Sept. 1994, at 3, 4 ("[Slome traditional exactions
formerly thought to be safe may now be at risk.").
1996]
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as a guidepost for creative and responsible regulation.
II. CREATIVE FEDERALISM: DOLAN AND THE QUEST
FOR A PROPER FIT
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Dolan is
noteworthy for its simplicity, an uncommon characteristic of Supreme
Court takings opinions. The Court emphasized four basic points: (1) the
Oregon courts misinterpreted Nollan by failing to go beyond the
"essential nexus" requirement when they adjudged the validity of the
city's conditional approval of petitioner's expansion plans;4" (2) in order
to provide guidance for future unconstitutional conditions cases involving
land-use regulation, the Supreme Court must determine what kind of
connection between exactions and development impact is required by the
Constitution;4' (3) a review of state court decisions convinced the Court
that localities must meet a "rough proportionality" standard to survive
federal takings challenges of this sort;42 and (4) Tigard had not yet met
its burden of making an individualized determination that the dedication
of an easement for a public greenway and of a fifteen-foot strip of land
for a public pedestrian/bicycle pathway were reasonably related to the
legitimate goals of controlling flood hazards and offsetting traffic
demands.4"
As with any court decision that generates dissenting opinions,
quibbling with the majority's conclusions is fair game. For example, is
the majority splitting hairs, as Justice Souter suggests in his dissent,44
when it faults state decisionmakers for misreading and misapplying
Nollan? After all, the Land Use Board of Appeals and the state
intermediate appellate and supreme courts all employed the "reasonable
40. Dolan, 114 S. Ct at 2315, 2317-18. See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d
853, 855-56 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), aJffd, 854 P.2d 437, 441-43 (Or. 1993), rev'd and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
41. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
42. Id. at 2318-20.
43. Id. at 2320-22.
44. Id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter believes that "the Court does
not apply [the rough proportionality] test to these facts, which do not raise the question
the Court addresses." Id. Indeed, he concludes that the majority's application of Nollan
is not "sound"! Id. at 2331.
[Vol. 50:5
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relationship" standard embraced (though renamed) by the Dolan
Court.
4
Or, does the majority adequately address Justice Stevens's claims
that "the 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine has ... long suffered
from notoriously inconsistent application" and that in the area of local
land-use regulation, the doctrine is anything but "well-settled"?
46
Consider Professor Epstein's description of the doctrine's pedigree:
[T]he doctrine of unconstitutional conditions tenaciously endures,
notwithstanding charges by figures no less distinguished than
Justice Holmes that it is both logically incoherent and corrosive of
sovereign power ... Like the police power, it is a creature of
judicial implication. It roams about constitutional law like
Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others. It has
been used as an aid in construing the scope of Congress' spending
power and of the states' police power. It has been engrafted onto
substantive protections afforded to speech, religion, and property.
It also has found expression in decisions under the equal protection
and due process clauses.47
Even the author of the majority opinion in Dolan has endorsed the notion
that the states' greater power to ban activities under the police power
includes the lesser power to condition approval of that same activity even
if the condition arguably impinges a constitutional right.48
Because the two published dissents in Dolan do a commendable job
of countering these and other potential weak spots in the majority's
presentation,49 we can turn our attention to Dolan's two major contribu-
tions to the regulatory takings dialogue: first, the adoption of a rough
45. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 854
P.2d 437, 44044 (Or. 1993), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
46. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5, 10-11 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
48. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
345-46 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.) ("In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.").
49. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
carefully and critically reads the cases cited by the majority as representative of the "rough
proportionality" standard, concluding in a sharp put-down that "although these state cases
do lend support to the Court's reaffirmance of Nollan's reasonable nexus requirement, the
role the Court affords them in the announcement of its newly minted second phase of the
constitutional inquiry is remarkably inventive." Id.
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proportionality standard for adjudging the validity of permit conditions
requiring the dedication of real property interests and second, the
placement of the burden of justifying that dedication on the public
regulator.
After detailing the petitioner landowner's dogged quest for relief
from the Tigard Planning Commissions' conditional grant of approval
(including unsuccessful challenges before the Oregon Land Use Board
of Appeals (LUBA), the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Oregon
Supreme Court), Rehnquist distills the dispute to its critical issue. The
key question, Rehnquist remarks, is whether "the 'city's unchallenged
factual findings' supporting the dedication conditions ... are constitu-
tionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on
petitioner's building permit."5  For guidance, the majority turns to
"representative" state cases for the basic reason that "state courts have
been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have." 51
Even Justice Stevens concedes the legitimacy of this excursion, though
his journey yields far different conclusions.52
Rehnquist's expedition takes him through three groupings of cases.
Like Goldilocks, he rejects the two extremes: those state courts that take
a "too soft" approach and are satisfied with regulators who provide
merely "very generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development," 53 and
those "too hard" jurisdictions that "require a very exacting correspon-
dence, described as the 'specifi[c] and uniquely attributable' test., 54
The majority deems "just right" those states occupying the "intermediate
position, requiring the municipality to show a 'reasonable relationship'
between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development."55  However, in order to avoid confusion with equal
50. Id. at 2318 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 (Or. 1993)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that cases cited by the majority
"either fail to support or decidedly undermine the Court's conclusions in key respects").
The most prominent example of the Court's sampling of state land-use decisions for
guidance on a federal constitutional question is found in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-93 (1926). See also infra text accompanying notes 160-65.
53. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
54. Id. at 2319 (quoting Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d
799, 802 (I11. 961)).
55. Id. (citing Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)).
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protection and due process analysis, the majority coins the term "rough
proportionality" for the preferred, middle standard. 6
Is there anything more than the pursuit of the golden mean 7
offered to justify Rehnquist's selection? Unfortunately the answer
appears to be "no," unless one counts three conclusory (though revealing)
statements by the Court. The first and most accommodating standard is
rejected because it "is too lax to adequately protect petitioner's right to
just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose.ss
However, the Court in Dolan is not concerned with the adequacy of
compensation once property has been taken (either through the positive
exercise of the power of eminent domain or through inverse condemna-
tion),5 9 but with the question of whether a taking has occurred in the
first place.
The majority does not adopt the second, most demanding, state court
test because it "[did] not think the Federal Constitution requires such
exacting scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved."6
Rehnquist does not amplify this statement in the text or in the footnotes,
56. Id. The term "rough proportionality" appeared in a 1987 article that discussed
"It]he trend toward requiring a better cost account for exactions." Fred P. Bosselman &
Nancy Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 95,
101, 103 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987) (cited in Eric D. Kelly,
Supreme Court Strikes Middle Ground on Exactions Test, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.,
July 1994, at 6, 7).
57. Professor Delgado provides a provocative take on the golden mean, one that holds
special meaning in the environmental context, in an imaginary exchange between himself
and Rodrigo, his "alter ego and interlocutor." Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle:
Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1581 n.1 (1993).
"Take, for example, Aristotle's famous doctrine of the Golden Mean. Everyone
reveres that, but a moment's reflection shows that it is completely wrong for our
times. A hundred years ago, it would have served some useful purpose. Then, we
were in an age of unchecked development, in which we mined the hillsides, dammed
the rivers, laid the forests to waste, and killed or relocated the Indians. Moderation
would have been a good philosophy to have had back then. But it came too late, just
as it did for ancient Greece. Today, the challenge is not for the U.S. to go on doing
what it has been doing all along, but moderately and judiciously. Our bubble is
drifting downward. We need to arrest the fall, but we won't discover the solution
through the discourse of moderation."
Id. at 1593-94 (footnote omitted).
58. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2319.
59. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE
PLANNING 831-69 (4th ed. 1989) for an overview of the theory of just compensation.
60. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2319.
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so we can only assume that what he means is that the right to just
compensation for a taking, though important, is not "fundamental"
enough to warrant strict scrutiny of government interference with that
right.6'
The Dolan Court is no more forthcoming when it discusses the
reasons for choosing the intermediate state court standard. Although the
Court stated that "the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority
of the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm" than the
first two standards,62 the Court nowhere describes just what those norms
are. Nor does the majority explain why "'rough proportionality' best
encapsulates what [it] hold[s] to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment."'63
Only when answering Justice Stevens's claim that Tigard's permit
condition is just a run-of-the-mill "species of business regulation that
heretofore warranted a strong presumption of constitutional validity"6'
does the majority drop a valuable hint as to their motives for choosing
the middle course. Rehnquist, after citing a number of cases in which
the Court invalidated business regulations," concludes, "We see no
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part
of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment,
should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable
circumstances." The majority in Dolan, like the Nollan Court that
insisted that "our opinions do not establish that these standards [of
review for takings cases] are the same as those applied to due process or
61. Cf TRIBE, supra note 13, § 16-7, at 1454 ("Legislative and administrative
classifications are to be strictly scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a
compelling governmental justification if they distribute benefits or burdens in a manner
inconsistent with fundamental rights.").
62. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2320 (quoting id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
65. Id. at 2320 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding a New
York order designed to reduce electricity consumption violated the First Amendment
because the order prohibited advertising by a utility company that promoted electricity
consumption); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding a statute that
authorized warrantless searches of business premises violated the Fourth Amendment); Air
Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974)).
66. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
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equal protection claims," '7 is offended by the low esteem in which
public regulators and their legal advocates hold private property rights,
particularly the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation. The
Court's active employment of the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine is thus an effort to redress the exercise of police power at the
expense of private property ownership and use.
Enhancing that effort is the Court's decision to place upon the
government regulators the burden ofjustifying the dedication. Again, as
in its selection of a standard for evaluating required dedications, the
Court made little effort to support its holding. The Court simply
reasoned that the city government properly bears the burden because "the
city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application
for a building permit on an individual parcel. 69  To bolster this
proposition the Court cited only Nollan;0 yet nowhere in that 1987
opinion is there a discussion of assignment of burdens for adjudicative
(as opposed to legislative) decisions.
Because the majority includes so many conclusory and unsupported
statements, the door is open to speculation as to the motives and agenda
of the Court. Professor Epstein's discourse on unconstitutional condi-
tions,7 though published eight years before Dolan, sheds some light on
this dim landscape. Epstein notes that the doctrine is "beset with the
serious problem of being a 'second best' approach to controlling
government discretion."72 Faced with situations in which federal or
state lawmakers "have absolute discretion," the Court has used the
doctrine "to 'take back' some of the power which had been conferred
67. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987).
68. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. The Court explained that under the "unconstitutional
conditions doctrine:"
[T]he government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here
the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property
sought has little or no relationship to benefit.
Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968)).
69. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
70. Id. (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836).
71. Epstein, supra note 47.
72. Id. at 28.
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upon government officials in the first instance."73 This approach is
"second best" because the doctrine would be unneeded "if the Court had
restricted the scope of the government power in the first instance."74
As discussed in Part IV below, it has been nearly seven decades
since the Court conceded to local governments the power to control the
use and enjoyment of real property through comprehensive, state-
sponsored, land-use regulation." While one or more Justices might be
sympathetic to a rescission of the original concession, a move advocated
by some leading land-use commentators and politicians,76 the majority
of the Dolan Court endorses a less drastic correction. The Court has
chosen to retool substantive (rough proportionality) and procedural
(governmental burden) elements in limited regulatory takings settings-in
those cases involving required dedications of real property interests as a
condition to development approval.
The Dolan Court's reconsideration of the deference accorded to
land-use regulators in "classic" land-use cases gains added significance
when coupled with the analytical shifts included in another recent
regulatory takings case-one that has already garnered a fair share of
criticism.77 Lucas, though its holding is directly applicable only to
cases involving regulations effecting total deprivation (an even narrower
context than Dolan), also holds a special bond with important land-use
and environmental law precedents, particularly as the Court invokes
common-law nuisance principles long eclipsed by modern statutes and
regulations.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
76. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON HOUSING 200-02 (1982) (advocating adoption of the "vital and pressing
governmental interest" standard in state and local legislation and urging Attorney General
to analyze whether the Supreme Court should be encouraged to adopt a new test); Douglas
W. Kmiec, Protecting Vital and Pressing Governmental Interests-A Proposal for a New
Zoning Enabling Act, 30 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 19 (1986); Daniel R.
Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifiing the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use
Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992). See also Epstein, supra note 47, at 63-64 ("In a cautious
second-best sense, Nollan is a fit case for using the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine.
But it is a far cry from the best solution, which is a return to the police power to its
traditional confines.").
77. See, e.g., Symposium, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1369 (1993); AFTER LucAs: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT COMPENSATION (David L. Callies ed., 1993); Wolf, supra note 22, at 470 n.9.
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III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: LUCAS AND
THE NUISANCES-PLUS EXCEPTION
Some might lay the blame (or credit) on Justice Scalia's"8 doorstep
for the introduction of the concept of a nuisances-plus exception 79 to the
modern law of regulatory takings.8" In fairness, however, we should
acknowledge that Scalia was not the first appellate jurist in the Lucas
dispute to play the nuisance card. The responsibility for raising the
nuisance topic goes instead to the two South Carolina Supreme Court
justices who dissented from the view that no constitutional violation had
occurred when they recognized that provisions of the state's Beachfront
Management Act"' might very well have effected a total taking of
David H. Lucas's two residential lots on the Isle of Palms.82 As Scalia
78. Although the majority opinions in cases such as Lucas and Nollan "belong" to the
Court, we are able to identify many of the concepts, strategies, and techniques found
therein with their chief author. For more on Scalia's jurisprudence, see supra note 23.
79. See Wolf, supra note 22, at 479-80. The Court in Lucas did not mandate
compensation for a total taking effected by a regulation that would merely "duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other
uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise."
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. Thus, Court observers are technically a bit misleading when
they refer to a "nuisance exception." See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1377-
79 (1993) (discussing "Reasonable Expectations and the Nuisance Exception").
80. More than one hundred years ago, when the Court was much more confident in
its ability to distinguish police power cases from takings cases, principles of nuisance law
were also quite relevant. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887):
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a
public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value
becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from
depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a
nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an
innocent owner.
Id. at 669.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995).
82. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 906 (S.C. 1991)
(Harwell, J., dissenting) ("Other regulations may provide for the prevention of a nuisance
and as such will not require compensation to an affected landowner.... In my opinion
the Beachfront Management Act does not have as its primary purpose the prevention of
a nuisance and is therefore not subject to the Mugler analysis."), rev'd and remanded, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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notes, at the first point in which nuisance appears in his opinion, the
dissenters
acknowledged that our Mugler line of cases recognizes governmen-
tal power to prohibit "noxious" uses of property-i.e., uses of
property akin to "public nuisances"--without having to pay
compensation. But they would not have characterized the
Beachfront Management Act's "primary purpose [as] the prevention
of a nuisance." To the dissenters, the chief purposes of the
legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation
of a "habitat for indigenous flora and fauna," could not fairly be
compared to nuisance abatement."
Now that the door was opened by others, the majority apparently felt free
to explore the connections between nuisance and takings even fur-
ther-and with surprising results.
This exploration in Lucas begins in somewhat familiar territoiy, as
Scalia reaches back past Justice Holmes's "too far" approach in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon84 to early Supreme Court precedent
on direct appropriation by the government of private property for public
use. Unfortunately, even seventy years after Holmes's contribution to
the regulatory takings dialogue, we still do not have a shared understand-
ing of the point at which regulation has gone "too far."86  This
inadequacy was acknowledged by Justice Brennan when, speaking for the
majority in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,87 he
described the Justices' practice of engaging in "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries."88 The Lucas Court then concludes that before the Court can
employ bright-line distinctions, the facts must reveal that the land-use
83. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (quoting Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906) (Harwell, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (referring to Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887)).
84. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[W]hile property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.") (cited in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893).
85. Lucas, 112 S. Ct at 2892 (citing Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1879); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897)).
86. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 ("[O]ur decision in Mahon offered little insight
into when, and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going 'too
far' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment."). See also Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:
Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
87. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
88. Id. at 124.
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regulation either causes a permanent physical occupation" or denies the
owner "economically viable use of his land.""
Only after this precedential excursion, and immediately following
Scalia's skillful deconstruction of the "harm-preventing"/tenefit-
concurring" dichotomy,9' does the analytical leap occur. Scalia states
that in complete deprivation cases, "we think [the state] may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with. 92 What can then be taken from the majority
opinion in Lucas is a new "total takings" test to accompany the Loretto
per se test for permanent physical occupations,93 Penn Central's ad hoc
test for less-than-total-deprivation regulatory takings,9" and the unconsti-
tutional conditions analysis introduced in Nollan95 and employed in
Dolan.96  According to the Lucas majority, when presented with
"confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically
beneficial use of land,"'97 the court must find in the challenged regula-
tion a direct link with common-law restraints on the use and ownership
of property-"[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or
89. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that offending cable wires and boxes caused a permanent
physical occupation)).
90. Id. at 2894 (quoting the familiar dictum from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980)). The language in Agins is dictum because, despite the challenged
regulation, the land apparently retained development potential. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262
("Although the ordinances limit development, they neither prevent the best use of
appellant's land, ... nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership.") (citations
omitted).
91. Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2897-99. Scalia observes that "the distinction between 'harm-
preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder," id. at
2897, and that "the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use' and that
which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-
free basis." Id at 2899.
92. Id. at 2899 (footnote omitted).
93. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
("We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interests that it may serve.").
94. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
95. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1987). See also
Epstein, supra note 47, at 60-64.
96. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316-17 (1994).
97. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
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decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership."98  Justice Scalia then
moves from the general to the specific:
A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons)
under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally, or otherwise."
The Court's illustrations of permitted total takings include the denial of
a landfill permit to the owner of a lake bed where the landfill would
result in the flooding of neighboring property..0 (assumedly preventing
what would be a private nuisance because of the unreasonable interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of the neighbor's real property), and the
requirement that a nuclear power plant company remove its facility
because it sits astride an earthquake fault.. (apparently abating a
public nuisance owing to the potential general harm to the community).
Further examining this area long-dominated by common law
analysis, Scalia refers to the nuisance formulas contained in the Second
Restatement of Torts."2 Although long-standing use suggests the
absence of a common-law prohibition, the law is by no means static.
The majority opinion cites two ways in which the common law (and, it
must be assumed, regulatory analogues) can adapt and evolve-"changed
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so."' "°3 Thus, even the most narrow, accurate
reading of Lucas-one that binds modem regulatory restrictions on land
use tightly to private and public nuisance-must include this potential for
growth and change. After all, the Court might have concluded that the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2900-01.
102. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-28,
830-31 (1979)).
103. Id. Although Scalia cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 827 cmt. g., that
comment, regarding "character of the locality" as one element used in determining the
gravity of harm in a private nuisance case, refers only impliedly to "changed circumstanc-
es" and not at all to "new knowledge."
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challenged regulation "must do no more than duplicate the result that had
[rather than 'could have']"° been achieved in the courts."
Four Justices objected to the majority's use of nuisance law, each
proffering his own reasons. Justice Kennedy was concerned with the
Procrustean challenge posed by the majority to states and localities,
noting that "[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for
the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent
society."' '  Justice Stevens echoed Kennedy's sentiment that "[t]he
Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law,""1°6
observing that the majority's "holding... effectively freezes the State's
common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional power to
revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."'0 7
At the other extreme, Justice Blackmun chided the majority for
resorting to, in Dean Prosser's terms, the "impenetrable jungle"'0 8 of
nuisance law, not because of its narrowness, but instead owing to its
amorphousness:
Common-law public and private nuisance law is simply a determi-
nation whether a particular use causes harm. There is nothing
magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They determined a
harm in the same way as state judges and legislatures do today....
There simply is no reason to believe that new interpretations of the
hoary common law nuisance doctrine will be particularly
"objective" or "value-free." Once one abandons the level of
generality of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, one searches in
vain, I think, for anything resembling a principle in the common
law of nuisance."°
Moreover, in his exploration of the framers' intent, Justice Blackmun
contended that the majority's inclusion of nuisance factors in the takings
calculus is ahistorical as well, for "[n]othing in the discussions in
Congress concerning the Takings Clause indicates that the Clause was
104. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
105. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2914 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984)).
109. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (citations omitted).
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limited by the common-law nuisance doctrine. '' 10
In a statement concluding that the writ of certiorari was improvi-
dently granted, Justice Souter cut through these encrustations of public
policy and history with laser-like logic. First, neither Lucas nor the trial
court demonstrated that a total deprivation had occurred."' Second,
even if total deprivation is conceivable in the abstract, it is highly
unlikely that nuisance abatement would leave an offending landowner
with absolutely no value."2 "Indeed," Souter observed, "it is difficult
to imagine property that can be used only to create a nuisance, such that
its sole economic value must presuppose the right to occupy it for such
seriously noxious activity."''' In other words, Justice Blackmun's
metaphor that "[t]oday the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse"'" 4
was misdirected. Instead, according to Souter, there might not even be
a mouse!
In fact, Justice Souter's contribution should console those critics of
the majority's categorical approach who fear widespread invalidation of
land-use and environmental regulation.' Even the most brazen
champion of private property rights should concede that cases in which
total deprivation is admitted by the state, is discovered by the trial court,
or is not addressed by the savings provisions in a challenged regulation
are rare, and will remain so. Thus, except for cases that fit within the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and unless a majority of the Court
abandons the parcel-as-a-whole approach,' 6 the great majority of
regulatory takings challenges will be analyzed under Penn Central's ad
hoc approach, allowing the court to consider not only the extent of harm
to the private landowner, but also the benefit to the general public as
expressed in nuisance and non-nuisance contexts." 7  Moreover, as
discussed previously, the broad reading of the majority's nuisance
110. Id. at 2916. For a careful (and critical) appraisal of Scalia's use of history,
particularly the notion of an "historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture," see Fisher, supra note 23, at 1397-1402.
111. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2925 (statement of Souter, J.) (criticizing grant of writ of
certiorari).
112. Id. at 2926.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. See supra note 7.
116. This is a real possibility. See infra text accompanying notes 303-12.
117. See Wolf, supra note 22, at 498-500.
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exception is careless at best, and alarmist at worst."18
It is time now to leave Dolan, Lucas, and 1990s takings law, and to
reconsider three earlier, pivotal attempts by the judiciary to reconcile
private property rights and public regulation. Even while looking
backward we should keep in mind Rehnquist's abrupt dismissal of
judicial deference and Scalia's singular merger of takings theory and
nuisance law. For when, at the conclusion of this Article, we revisit
Tigard's Central Business District and the South Carolina oceanfront, our
return will be informed by a greater appreciation of the intricate
interrelationship of land-use and environmental regulation and their
common-law precursors.
IV. FROM FURNACES TO PIGS: EUCLID AND THE
MODERNIZATION OF PRIVATE NUISANCE
The centrality of the Supreme Court's opinion in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co."9 is beyond dispute. 2 Indeed, it is common-
place to identify the predominant mode of land-use regulation-the
comprehensive employment of height, area, and use classifications-as
Euclidean zoning. 2' Justice George Sutherland's majority opinion
holds its important place in American law as much for its notoriety as for
its continued applicability to planning and zoning disputes.'
As we glance backward from the perspective of Lucas and Dolan,
the present focus is not solely on the zoning aspects of Euclid, but on the
way in which the opinion resonates with the concerns, rhetoric, and
perspective of the "civil" branch of common-law nuisance: private
nuisance.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
119. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
120. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v.
Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES
STILL TO KEEP 252, 252-53 and 271-72 nn.10-1I1 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden
eds., 1989).
121. See, e.g., James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The
Emerging New Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARv. L. REv. 489
(1994).
122. Euclid "is much more than a milestone, more than a reference point cited out of
habit or to appeal to the audience's familiarity gained over generations of use.... [The
Euclid opinion] anticipate[s] key challenges to the Euclidean regime raised over the
subsequent six decades (and, from all indications, beyond) .... " Wolf, supra note 120,
at 253.
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Although definitional problems are legion, there is general
agreement that private nuisance involves nontrespassory invasion that
unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of one's real
property.'2 In essence, then, private nuisance is a real property
tort.124 It is not an all-purpose tool designed to limit, abate, or inhibit
activities that pose harm to the community-at-large, but a limited cause
of action that enables a court to ensure that neighboring or adjoining uses
are reasonably compatible. 25 Moreover, the oft-recited incantation, sic
utere tuo,126 merely reminds us that the rights of ownership and
enjoyment of land are not absolute.
Because Euclid was merely segregating and restricting uses in a
comprehensive manner,'27 and because the growing practice of separat-
ing neighborhoods of detached homes from businesses and apartment
buildings was not clearly a matter of protecting the public from
123. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (defining private nuisance
as "a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821D (1979) (defining private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land").
124. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 123, § 87, at 619 ("The essence of private
nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land.").
125. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.02, at 100 (3d ed. 1993).
Professor Mandelker notes that
[Private n]uisance actions are an extension of the private tort of trespass to land. In
the trespass action, the landowner sues for a physical invasion of her property by
another. No physical invasion occurs in nuisance cases. The plaintiff landowner
complains that the use of adjacent land detrimentally affects her land, and that a court
can enjoin this use and award damages for any injury suffered.
Id.
126. See, e.g. Bove v. Donner-Hana Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229,231 (N.Y. App. Div.
1932). The court writes:
As a general rule, an owner is at liberty to use his property as he sees fit, without
objection or interference from his neighbor, provided such use does not violate an
ordinance or statute. There is, however, a limitation to this rule; one made necessary
by the intricate, complex, and changing life of today. The old and familiar maxim
that one must so use his property as not to injure that of another (sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas) is deeply imbedded in our law. An owner will not be permitted
to make an unreasonable use of his premises to the material annoyance of his
neighbor, if the latter's enjoyment of life or property is materially lessened thereby.
Id.
127. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-83 (1926) (describing Euclid's
zoning scheme).
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significant harms, 2 ' public nuisance law alone did not control.
Because the interests protected by comprehensive zoning so closely
matched the interests protected by private nuisance, it made great sense
for Sutherland and his colleagues to pursue private nuisance analogies
along with the public nuisance precedent. When we sift through
Sutherland's Euclid text, there are strong suggestions that the goals,
effects, and application of zoning laws have much in common with
private nuisance.
First, Sutherland describes the physical layout of Ambler's property
in Euclid: sixty-eight acres bordered on two sides by residential
neighborhoods. 29  The use classification detailed in the opinion is
designed to ensure that many of these neighbors and others situated in
the new residential-use zones, like residential plaintiffs in so many
private nuisance cases, will not be disturbed in the use and enjoyment of
their homes by intensive and discordant land uses. Such uses include the
operation of stores,'30 gasoline stations,' public garages,'32 facto-
ries, 133 laundries,'34 dry cleaners, 3 ' vehicle repair shops,'36 sew-
age disposal plants,' scrap iron and junk businesses,' 38 and correc-
tional facilities.
39
Second, the disgruntled landowner negatively affected by the
assignment of a zoning classification (here the Ambler Realty Company)
has much in common with the defendant in a private nuisance suit. Like
128. Id. at 390.
129. Id. at 379.
130. See, e.g., Stodder v. Rosen Talking Mach. Co., 135 N.E. 251 (Mass. 1922)
(describing nuisance caused by retail shoe store).
131. See, e.g., Carney v. Penn Oil Co., 140 A. 133 (Pa. 1928).
132. See, e.g., George v. Goodovich, 135 A. 719 (Pa. 1927).
133. See, e.g., Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900 (Md. 1890).
134. See, e.g., Abend v. Royal Laundry Serv., Inc., 192 A. 239 (N.J. Ch.), aftfd, 192
A. 241 (N.J. 1937).
135. See, e.g., Burdick v. Stebbins, 231 N.W. 57 (Mich. 1930).
136. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Guaranty Corp., 129 A. 114 (Pa. 1925).
137. See, e.g,, Thompson v. Kraft Cheese Co., 291 P. 204 (Cal. 1930).
138. See, e.g., Hagaman v. Slaughter, 354 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn. CL App. 1961).
139. See, e.g., Arkansas Release Guidance Found. v. Needler, 477 S.W.2d 821 (Ark.
1972).
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those common-law defendants, 4 ' Ambler urged the Court to consider
its economic plight. According to Ambler, "the ordinance attempts to
restrict and control the lawful uses of appellee's land so as to confiscate
and destroy a great part of its value,"'' and "operates greatly to reduce
the value of appellee's lands and destroy their marketability for
industrial, commercial and residential uses."
42
Third, as the Court moves from description (the facts of the extant
dispute) to prescription (the resolution of this and analogous cases),
Sutherland openly invites comparisons regarding the operation of a
zoning ordinance and the application of private nuisance principles.
When a doubtful situation arises, according to Sutherland, "the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation of so
much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly
helpful clew"'43 to the decisionmaker. Moreover, the resolution of the
typical public or private law land-use case depends upon the specific
context of the dispute, not on per se rules,'44 a point immortalized by
the aphorism, "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."' 45 In fact, one
of the classic English private nuisance cases, Aldred's Case,'46 con-
140. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-73 (N.Y. 1970)
(accepting the argument that enjoining defendant's cement plant, which represented a
forty-five million dollar investment and employed over 300 people, would be an
"immediately drastic remedy"); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 805-06
(N.Y. 1913) (rejecting defendant's argument that enjoining defendant's mill that
represented an investment of over one million dollars and employed between 400 and 500
people would cause greater injury than "the small injury done to the plaintiff's land by that
portion of the pollution which was regarded as attributable to the defendant").
141. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
142. Id. at 386.
143. Id. at 387.
144. For recent zoning cases in which courts have stressed the specific context of the
dispute, see Harris Bank of Hinsdale v. County of Kendall, 625 N.E.2d 845, 849 (III. App.
Ct. 1993) ("A court should base its determination of the validity of a zoning ordinance on
the facts and circumstances of each case. No single factor is controlling.") (citation
omitted); Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. People's Counsel, 624 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993) ("Zoning matters ... depend upon the unique facts and circumstances of a
particular location and must be analyzed individually."); State ex rel. Barber & Sons
Tobacco Co. v. Jackson County, 869 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("[R]eviewing
courts must look at the particular facts and circumstances of each case in determining the
reasonableness of existing zoning.").
145. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
146. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
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cerned a pig sty that disturbed the plaintiff in the enjoyment of his
residence.'47
Unfortunately, because Sutherland does not identify which type of
nuisance is relevant to the case before the Court, he contributes to the
profound confusion that already plagued nuisance law. On the one hand,
Sutherland leaves some helpful clues that he is referring to private
nuisance: the recitation of sic utere tuo (a maxim that originally
emphasized the protection of one's interest in land),'48 the "pig in the
147. Those searching for the out-of-place "pig" and the pristine "parlor" located in
Euclid, Ohio need only turn a few pages until reaching Sutherland's menacing portrayal
of the apartment house, the "parasite" of the single-family, residential district:
[T]he coming of one apartment house is followed by others ... until, finaily, the
residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which
in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly
desirable, come very near to being nuisances.
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95.
As I have noted elsewhere, Sutherland's decision to change the analogy offered by
Alfred Bettman in his amicus brief has disturbing exclusionary connotations. See Wolf,
supra note 120, at 273 n.50 (quoting Alfred Bettman, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company Brief amici curiae, in, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 157, 172 (Arthur
Coleman Comey ed., 1946) (asserting that "put[ting] the furnace in the cellar rather than
in the living room may improve taste and aesthetics, but more significantly creates a
healthier living environment"). Our current concern, however, is with what Sutherland's
language suggests about the type of nuisance that provides the court with its "helpful
clew."
148. For example, the maxim appears in Aldred's Case, a private nuisance action. 77
Eng. Rep. at 821. See also Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1897). The
Court writes:
There is no doubt of the general proposition that a man may do what he will with
his own, but this right is subordinate to another, which finds expression in the
familiar maxim: "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." His right to erect what he
pleases upon his own land will not justify him in maintaining a nuisance, or in
carrying on a business or trade that is offensive to his neighbors. Ever since Aldred's
Case, 9 Coke, 57, it has been the settled law, both of this country and of England,
that a man has no right to maintain a structure upon his own land, which, by reason
of disgusting smells, loud or unusual noises, thick smoke, noxious vapors, the jarring
of machinery or the unwarrantable collection of flies, renders the occupancy of
adjoining property dangerous, intolerable or even uncomfortable to its tenants. No
person maintaining such a nuisance can shelter himself behind the sanctity of private
property.
Id.
By the early nineteenth century, as reflected in two landmark Supreme Court cases, the
maxim was used to help limit the boundaries of the states' police and penal powers as
well. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1824) ("The right to use all property, must
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parlor" reference, and the emphasis on the positive effect that segregating
undesirable uses has on the enjoyment and value of nearby real
(particularly residential) property.
On the other hand, Sutherland identifies such public-nuisance-like
general harms to the community as "the danger of fire or collapse, the
evils of overcrowding, and the like."'149 Despite the growth of legisla-
tive and administrative controls in the wake of Euclid, the confusing
nature of nuisance law still presents significant challenges for jurists
resolving disputes concerning the use and abuse of land. 5 '
Sutherland informs us that he is consulting nuisance law, "not for
the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the
be subject to modification by municipal law. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas [sic],
is a fundamental maxim. It belongs exclusively to the local State Legislatures, to
determine how a man may use his own, without injuring his neighbour."); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 374 (1821) ("Nobody objects to a State enforcing its own penal
laws: all that is claimed is, that in executing them, it should not violate the laws of the
Union, which are paramount: Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.").
149. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
150. See, e.g., Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1120 (7th Cir.
1975). The court writes:
This case is representative of the new breed of lawsuit spawned by the growing
concern for cleaner air and water. The birth and burgeoning growth of environmental
litigation have forced the courts into difficult situations where modem hybrids of the
traditional concepts of nuisance law and equity must be fashioned. Nuisance has
always been a difficult area for the courts; the conflict of precedents and the
confusing theoretical foundations of nuisance, led Prosser to tag the area a "legal
garbage can."
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 123, for a list of seven
reasons for the continuing confusion: (1) the tendency of courts to "seize upon a
catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a problem;" id. § 86; (2) "two lines of
development, the one narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use or
enjoyment of land, and the other extending to virtually any form of annoyance or
inconvenience interfering with common public rights," id; (3) the "fact that a public
nuisance may also be a private one, when it interferes with the enjoyment of land, and that
... there are circumstances in which a private individual may have a tort action for the
public offense itself," id. (footnotes omitted); (4) the existence of"a considerable number
of cases which have applied the term to matters not connected either with land or with any
public right," id. (footnote omitted); (5) "the line between trespass and nuisance has
become wavering and uncertain," a development attributable to the reality that "[w]ith the
abandonment of the old procedural forms, direct and indirect invasions have lost their
significance," id. § 87; (6) courts' "failure to make [the] clear distinction between the
requirements for injunctive relief [unreasonable conduct] and the requirements for damages
[unreasonable interference]," id.; (7) "the use of the term 'nuisance' to describe all
nontrespassory but actionable interferences with the use and enjoyment of land." Id.
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process of ascertaining the scope of, the [police] power.'..'. If Euclid
were a public nuisance case, in which the local government sought to
abate outright activities perceived as harmful to the community,'52
analogies would not be needed. Indeed, the set of legitimate goals of the
police power found in Euclid and numerous other cases involving
constitutional challenges to governmental activity--"public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare"' 53-restates the bases upon which public
nuisance abatement actions have and can be brought.'
The private nuisance aspects of Euclid were key to the legitimiza-
tion of state-authorized, locally controlled zoning law as a special form
of police power regulation.'55 In essence, the Supreme Court sent a
message to municipalities throughout the country that they no longer
needed to rely on private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits alleging loss of
value or incompatibility in order to realize the benefits of a livable and
compatible community."
151. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88. The Lucas Court violated at least the spirit of this
caveat when it imbued nuisance law with "controlling" force in cases involving police
power regulations effecting total deprivation.
152. See, e.g., Ex parte Wood, 227 P. 908, 910 (Cal. 1924) ("As a public nuisance
concerns die public generally, it is the duty of the government to take measures to abate
or enjoin it.") (quoting 5 PoMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 4296 (4th ed. n.d.)).
153. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. Included among the Supreme Court zoning cases
that cite the Euclid formula are Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6
(1977); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976); Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); and Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927).
Before Euclid, the Court used this formula in some of its most notorious substantive due
process cases. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 16 (1915); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). According to the Lochner court,
There are... certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union,
somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of
which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and
without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public.
Id. at 53.
154. See, e.g., Schnitzer v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 160 S.W. 282 (Mo. Ct. App.
1912) (abating storage of explosives posing threat to public safety); Respass v.
Commonwealth, 115 S.W. 1131 (Ky. 1909) (abating gambling house posing threat to
public morals); Board of Health v. Coputt, 24 N.Y.S. 625 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd 35 N.E.
443 (N.Y. 1893) (abating maintenance of polluted mill pond posing threat to public
health).
155. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
156. Id. at 395.
Washington University Open Scholarship
34 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
Local governments could act preemptively and administratively, as
long as the landowners who were negatively affected by zoning
regulations were left with reasonable use of their property,'57 a caveat
that apparently did not apply in public nuisance abatement cases. 5
Zoning was a powerful weapon that localities could add to a regulatory
arsenal that already included public nuisance. Indeed, Sutherland spends
much of the Euclid opinion reviewing, A la Dolan, state court decisions
regarding the legality of existing local planning and zoning regimes.'59
The "serious question" posed to the Justices by the facts in Euclid
concerned "provisions of the [local zoning ordinance] excluding from
residential districts, apartment houses, business houses, retail stores and
shops, and other like establishments. ' '6° The Court could find suffi-
cient precedent in its own opinions for segregating homes from more
intensive industrial and commercial uses.' 6 1 On the "validity of what
is really the crux of the more recent zoning legislation, namely, the
creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which business and
trade of every sort... are excluded," Sutherland turned to state decisions
he deemed "numerous and conflicting."' 62
Unlike the somewhat choppy excursion through state waters taken
157. Professor Mandelker writes:
The Supreme Court and a clear majority of the state courts hold that a landowner is
not denied an economically viable use unless the land use regulation does not allow
him to make any reasonable use of his land. Courts adopting the majority view
sometimes state that a landowner's property is "confiscated" if he is not allowed a
reasonable use of his land.
See MANDELKER, supra note 125, § 2.05, at 23.
158. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). According to Justice John M.
Harlan:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public,
is not... burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual
for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.
Id. at 669.
159. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392-93.
160. Id. at 390.
161. Id. at 388 (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting brick
works in a residential area); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (prohibiting
livery stables in certain areas); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (allowing height
restrictions for residential district)).
162. Id. at 390.
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by Rehnquist before emerging with the requirement that the government
demonstrate "rough proportionality" before it conditions development
permission, 6 ' Sutherland's smoother and unchallenged"6 expedition
revealed that the predominant and growing trend favored allowing local
government experimentation with comprehensive zoning schemes to
proceed.'65 Because the Euclid majority had no reason to believe that
the village's ordinance on its face was "clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare,"'" the landowner's challenge was dismissed. With
the Supreme Court's blessing, as embodied in this extremely deferential
standard, zoning flourished in the United States and dominated the urban
and suburban scene by mid-century.'67
The Euclid Court did reserve the right to invalidate a zoning
ordinance as "concretely applied to particular premises ... or to
particular conditions,"'"' an invitation for challenges such as Mrs.
Dolan's. Yet the standard for such challenges remained "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable," a heavy (though not impossible) 69 burden for any
private landowner to carry. Euclid's approach to land-use regulation,
supported by "commissions and experts,"'70 easily satisfied this test.
Tigard, held to a more demanding standard, would have to try again.
How can we explain these contrasts? Critics of the holding in
Dolan will join Justice Stevens in accusing the majority of"resurrect[ing]
... a species of substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected
163. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
164. Unlike Justice Stevens (who was joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg) and
Justice Souter in Dolan, the dissenters filed no opinion in Euclid.
165. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390-93.
166. Id. at 395.
167. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 189 ("At the close of 1930, zoning
ordinances were in effect in 981 municipalities throughout the United States, representing
a population of more than 46 million, some 67 percent of the urban population.") (citation
omitted). See also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 241-43 (1985) (noting that the introduction and
growth of zoning ordinances served to segregate economic classes).
168. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
169. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (finding zoning
ordinance invalid as applied to plaintiff in error).
170. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
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decades ago."' Ironically, the Justice who penned the deferential
Euclid opinion is more (in)famous as one of the chief adherents of
judicial activism in the name of liberty and property.' Handwringing
and namecalling, while they may serve some cathartic function, do little
to advance the debate over line-drawing in the areas of land-use and
environmental regulation. The explanation for the seeming gap between
Euclid and Dolan lies not in rhetoric but in the Courts' divergent
perceptions of the motives and abilities of local government regulators.
The Euclid Court, though it could have discounted the importance
of the village as a minor player in a major metropolitan region, greater
Cleveland,'73 chose instead to emphasize the petitioner local govern-
ment's autonomy and self-determination. "[T]he village, though
physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality,
with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit.
• .,,14Although Rehnquist pays some lip service to the "commend-
able" performance of suburban local governments, 75 the substantive
171. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For a fascinating exchange between two leading conservative legal thinkers on the
advisability of a revival ofjudicial protection of property rights, compare Richard Epstein,
Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711, 717-18 (1985) ("One
only has to read the opinions of the Supreme Court on economic liberties and property
rights to realize that these opinions are intellectually incoherent and that some movement
in the direction of judicial activism is clearly indicated.") with Antonin Scalia, Economic
Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703, 705-06 (1985) ("I will.., say that in my view
the position the Supreme Court has arrived at is good-or at least that the suggestion that
it change its position is even worse."). See also United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018,
2026 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If I thought that 'substantive due process' were a
constitutional right rather than an oxymoron. . . ."), cited in Dolan, 114 S. Ci. at 2329
n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
By employing, as in Nollan, the "second-best" strategy of unconstitutional conditions
to check regulatory abuse, Justice Scalia can have his jurisprudential cake (that is,
maintaining his disdain for substantive due process) while eating it, too (that is,
invalidating private property controls). See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
172. See JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE
STATE (1951); Michael A. Wolf, George Sutherland, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 449 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
173. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389 ("It is said that the Village of Euclid is a mere
suburb of the City of Cleveland ...
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322 ("Cities have long engaged in the
commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization
particularly in metropolitan
areas such as Portland.").
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legacy of Dolan-elevated scrutiny and a shift in burden-is quite to the
contrary. In revisiting two other "classic" land-use planning cases, we
will gain some insight on this discernible 76 and potentially outcome-
determinative... shift in attitudes.
V. RETHINKING DEFERENCE: MT. LAUREL I, FASANO,
AND CHECKING LOCAL ABUSE
The suburban boom following the end of World War II posed new
challenges to land-use planners, to local government officials, and,
ultimately, to advocates and judges involved in the litigation that, in
America, inevitably accompanies economic progress.' Each munici-
pality, without regard to size or access to planning expertise, had been
deemed worthy of respect by the Euclid Court.'79 As middle-class
families sought to escape the problems of the central cities-crowding,
crime, pollution, and the like-farming towns were swiftly transformed
into bedroom communities. 8 ' The height, area, and use regulations of
Euclidean zoning held great promise as tools for ensuring that urban
176. See, e.g., id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority has "aban-
don[ed] the traditional presumption of constitutionality and impos[ed] a novel burden of
proof').
177. The Court remanded Dolan to the state court so that Tigard would have the
opportunity to carry its burden of demonstrating rough proportionality. Dolan, 114 S. Ct.
at 2322. More specifically, the city would have to show "why a public greenway, as
opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control," id. at 2320, and
"make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/
bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic
demand generated." Id. at 2322.
178. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 167.
A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of home building in 1946-1947 in six
metropolitan regions determined that the suburbs accounted for at least 62 percent of
construction. By 1950 the national suburban growth rate was ten times that of central
cities, and in 1954 the editors of Fortune estimated that 9 million people had moved
to the suburbs in the previous decade.
Id. at 238.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
180. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 167, at 275-76 ("After World War II, the racial
and economic polarization of large American metropolitan areas became so pronounced
that downtown areas lost their commercial hold on the middle class. Cities became identi-
fied with fear and danger rather than with glamour and pleasure.").
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problems remained confined within the city's political boundaries.'
In the 1950s a few voices cried out about the exclusionary
tendencies of favored suburban zoning devices such as large-lot zoning
(one- and two-acre minima were quite popular) and minimum square
footage requirements.' The seeds of protest were planted in
dissenting opinions by judges who were skeptical about the motives of
local government officials and in law review commentaries by experts
concerned about the implications and propriety of socioeconomic and
racial segregation.
On the judicial side, Justice John C. Bell, Jr. of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court took his colleagues to task for endorsing "the doctrine of
unlimited police power' 8 3 in upholding a one-acre lot minimum, a
practice Bell labeled "an intentional and exclusionary interdiction [that]
is contrary to our constitutional guarantees and to the American Way of
Life."' Similarly, Justice A. Dayton Oliphant cautioned fellow
members of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v.
Wayne Township85 that their indulgence of Wayne Township's mini-
mum dwelling size scheme advanced the cause of socioeconomic
segregation.'86 He warned that "[c]ertain well-behaved families will
be barred from these communities, not because of any acts they do or
conditions they create, but simply because the income of the family will
not permit them to build a house at the cost testified to in this case."''8 7
Law reviews of the day featured voices in support of the jeremiads
of Bell, Oliphant, and others. 8 ' For example, the holding in Lionshead
181. Jackson notes that "in suburbs everywhere, North and South, zoning was used by
the people who already lived within the arbitrary boundaries of a community as a method
of keeping everyone else out. Apartments, factories, and 'blight,' euphemisms for blacks
and pdople of limited means, were rigidly excluded." Id. at 242.
182. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne
Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953); Norman Williams, Jr., Planning Laiv and
Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317 (1955).
183. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851, 859 (Pa. 1958) (Bell,
J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 865.
185. 89 A.2d 693 (NJ. 1952).
186. Id. at 701 (Oliphant, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. See also Vickers v. Township Comm., 181 A.2d 129, 147 (N.J. 1962) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (contending that although municipality could legitimately use the zoning power
to bar trailer camps from industrial district, that ability should not "encompass the right
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Lake inspired Charles Haar's quick and incisive retort, in which he noted
that
[s]egregation of many kinds is on the increase in the land-use field.
S. . [S]egregation is being increasingly accomplished in terms of
levels of prices and rentals, of home ownership versus renting, even
of age and of veteran status. Exclusionary planning devices which
are designed to accomplish such segregation should not be saved by
dint of "liberal" cosmetics or "progressive" polish.'89
Similarly, Norman Williams bemoaned the fact that "courts,
constitutional lawyers, and the leaders of democratic thought and action
remain unconcerned" about exclusionary planning and zoning
practices."' He pulled no punches when he characterized and
explained this apathy:
This remarkable and widespread lack of interest is due in part to a
lack of realization of the significance of a mis-planned environment,
and in part to sheer muddleheadedness. The leaders of liberal-
democratic thought are all too often so confused with abstractions
("health, safety, morals and welfare," "character of the neighbor-
hood," etc.), so full of respect for local autonomy, and so fearful of
judicial review generally, as to be unable to understand the
implications of what is going on.'g'
Though there were further stirrings, the 1950s ended with no significant
shift in direction by the nation's courts.
Because of the daunting barriers to federal judicial relief, the fight
against exclusionary local land-use practices was (and continues to be)
fought primarily in state courts. The Supreme Court offered a cautionary
signal to potential litigants in Warth v. Seldin92 when the Justices
strictly interpreted federal standing requirements. 93  In Arlington
to erect barricades on their boundaries through exclusion or too tight restriction of uses
where the real purpose is to prevent feared disruption with a so-called chosen way of
life").
189. Haar, supra note 182, at 1062-63 (footnotes omitted).
190. Williams, supra note 182, at 349.
191. Id. at 349-50.
192. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
193. The Supreme Court warned that
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent
the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that
they would have been able to purchase or lease... and that, if the court affords the
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Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,94 the Court
instructed those alleging racial exclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment
required proof of discriminatory intent.' Use of the Fair Housing
Act "'96 remains a crucial strategy for litigants who can demonstrate a
pattern of racial bias, although the High Court has yet to confirm that a
showing of discriminatory intent is not mandated by that federal
statute. 97
Finally, in Memphis v. Greene98 a majority of the Court searched
in vain for a Civil Rights Act or a Thirteenth Amendment violation
occasioned by the city's decision to close off a predominantly white
neighborhood from traffic to and from the predominantly African-
American neighborhood to the north." One of the justifications
offered for the decision by Memphis was the reduction of "'traffic
pollution' in a residential area, e.g., noise, litter, interruption of
community living.' °
This primitive form of local environmental protection is evocative
of the Euclid Court's concern that
the coming of one apartment house is followed by others,
interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air
and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall
upon the smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary
accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic
relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed.
Id. at 504.
194. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
195. Id. at 265 ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1994) (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
197. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d
Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). Six Justices, in aper curiam opinion, stated that "[s]ince
appellants conceded the applicability of the disparate-impact test for evaluating the zoning
ordinance under Title VIII, we do not reach the question whether that test is the
appropriate one." 488 U.S. at 18. See also HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 456-60;
MANDELKER, supra note 125, §§ 7.04-.06.
198. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
199. See id. at 128-29 ("This case does not disclose a violation of any of the enabling
legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment .... [T]he
impact of the closing of West Drive on nonresidents of Hein Park is a routine burden of
citizenship; it does not reflect a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.").
200. Id. at 104.
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and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked
automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from
their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet and
open spaces for play .... "'
In neither Supreme Court case did it appear that the local government
was concerned with the environmental well-being of those fenced out by
the challenged decision.20 2
By the end of the turbulent civil rights era, the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania high courts had taken the lead in the struggle against
exclusionary zoning. They ordered the blatant and recalcitrant offenders
to break down their barriers to affordable housing and, in some cases, to
implement affirmative measures to provide low- and moderate-income
dwellings.2"3 In order to reach this point, judges and advocates had to
overcome a significant rationale for large-lot zoning: proponents of this
land-use tool pointed out the environmental harms posed by crowding
too many residences into ecologically sensitive parcels that offered
pastoral escapes from the urban throng.
In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,2" for
example, the New Jersey township proffered an ecological rationale for
the large-lot zoning-"namely that low population density zoning
provides protection against floods and other surface drainage problems
and against diversion of water from an aquifer, an underground water
resource."0 5  Superior Court Judge David D. Furman concluded that
the necessary engineering data, ecological data, and expert opinions
"were lacking both in the legislative process and at the trial. 2 6
The most significant attempt to justify "snob zoning" as environ-
201. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
202. Because dirty industry and hazardous waste disposal sites
are rarely found in bedroom communities and upper-middle-class suburbia, exclusionary
zoning is the chief environmental justice issue facing many of the nation's local
governments. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice ": The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993).
203. The leading cases are Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.) (Mount Laurel 1), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975);
and National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965). See HAAR & WOLF,
supra note 59, at 376-445; CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE,
AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996).
204. 283 A.2d 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971).
205. Id. at 358.
206. Id. at 359.
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mental planning is found in Mount Laurel I,2"7 the most notorious state
exclusionary zoning case. In the first round before the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the justices in Mount Laurel I were asked to consider
allegations of potential environmental harm posed by multi-family and
smaller detached dwellings." 8 Specifically, it was alleged "that the
area is without sewer or water utilities and that the soil is such that this
plot size is required for safe individual lot sewage disposal and water
supply."2
9
As in Township of Madison, the supreme court was not persuaded.
Justice Frederick W. Hall, speaking for the Mount Laurel I majority,
conceded the general importance of "ecological or environmental factors
or problems,"21 but dismissed the specific objections raised by Mount
Laurel. The court's skepticism was palpable. Hall concluded that "[t]he
present environmental situation of the area is ... no sufficient excuse in
itself for limiting housing therein to single-family dwellings on large
lots."2"' Faced with allegations that middle-class communities were
using land-use regulation for purposes of socioeconomic segregation, the
Mt. Laurel I court was unwilling to defer unconditionally to the wisdom
of local officials.
The wisdom of this break with Euclidean tradition is hard to deny,
particularly when the facts strongly suggest that local officials are
attempting to employ environmentalism to cloak their exclusionary
practices. This is not to say that there is no place for local implementa-
tion and enforcement of environmental protection programs. Indeed,
many localities have responded responsibly and creatively to federal and
state mandates regarding wetlands, 2 ' floodplains,1 3 and development
207. 336 A.2d 713 (NJ.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). See, e.g., Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1198-99 n.3 (N.J. 1977)
(providing early reactions to Mt. Laurel 1).
208. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 731.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. See also Brian W. Blaesser et al., Advocating Affordable Housing in New
Hampshire: The Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Planning Association in Wayne
Britton v. Town of Chester, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 14 (1991) (noting
that "[t]he desire to preserve the environment is often cited as a reason for imposing severe
restrictions on land development," and that "[e]cological concerns may mask exclusionary
motives").
212. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 709-22; LINDA A. MALONE,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE §§ 4.01-.10 (6th ed. 1995); MANDELKER,
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in the coastal zone.214 Moreover, courts have employed regulatory
takings law to check abuses in all three of these areas, at times
penalizing overzealous or careless officials who have gone "too far."
215
When we move beyond these areas and others like them in which
the locality is proceeding in accordance with the commands of a
centralized authority (that is, state and federal legislators or environmen-
tal agencies), local environmental regulation poses special challenges.
First, local governments, which are often hard pressed to perform
comprehensive planning and zoning duties, 216 are rarely equipped on
their own to devise, implement, and enforce environmental control
schemes." 7 Second, multi-jurisdictional regulation is often required
supra note 125, §§ 12.02-.06; SALSICH, supra note 32, § 10.07.
213. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 702-08; MALONE, supra note 212,
§§ 7.01-.08; MANDELKER, supra note 125, §§ 12.07-.08.
214. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 756-61; MALONE, supra note 212,
§§ 2.02-.04; MANDELKER, supra note 125, §§ 12.13-.14; SALSICH, supra note 32, § 10.08.
Cf Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone Management Act and the Takings Clause in the
1990's: Making the Case for Federal Land Use to Preserve Coastal Areas, 62 U. COLO.
L. REv. 711 (1991).
215. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (prohibiting
the California Coastal Commission from conditioning a rebuilding permit on granting a
public easement in the coastal zone); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding a regulation restricting building on wetlands to be a
regulatory taking); Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964)
(holding a zoning change making plaintiff's realty part of a floodplain district was
unreasonable and confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
216. One scholar observes:
The texts of zoning ordinances, more than other laws, are fashioned and debated by
the citizenry. Few small cities have the legislative drafting resources of state or
national legislatures. A city ordinance, particularly in a small city, is unlikely to
bring out a battery of private lawyers with a prolix array of language proposals that
tends to iron the character out of the drafted word. Instead, the individual members
of the city council, together with the volunteer planning and zoning commission and
an often overworked city staff, try their own hands-on approach to proposing legal
language.
Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 1057, 1065 (1990). For the equally grim rural version, see Contemporary Studies
Project, Rural Land Use Regulation in Iowa: An Empirical Analysis of County Board of
Adjustment Practices, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1083 (1983). Cf Carol M. Rose, Planning and
Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV.
837, 868 (1983) ("[I]n local governments' land changes, technical expertise is no assurance
at all, because local governments simply do not have it.").
217. The federal government has responded to the scarcity of local resources with
mixed success. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Lessons from a Public Policy Failure: EPA
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because many environmental externalities such as acid deposition,2
groundwater pollution,219 and oil spills"0 fail to respect artificial
political boundaries." Third, there is a greater likelihood that without
and Noise Abatement, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1992). Shapiro writes:
After congressional oversight hearings revealed that EPA's original mandate was
inadequate to foster state and local initiatives, Congress passed the Quiet Communi-
ties Act of 1978. The Act authorized ONAC [EPA's Office of Noise Abatement and
Control] to create a grants program and offer technical assistance to stimulate state
and local noise abatement.
After receiving its new authority, ONAC embarked on an ambitious and innovative
program of support for local and state governments. ONAC offered a limited amount
of direct financial assistance to a small number of states and cities, but most of its
efforts consisted of providing technical support through regional technical centers,
creating the ECHO (Each Community Helping Others) program, and hosting over 100
training programs attended by 4000 noise officials. ONAC also wrote and distributed
model state and local noise ordinances. Lastly, ONAC established a "buy-quiet"
program that offered communities model contract specifications for the purchase of
low noise emission products.
The demise of state and local programs after 1981, when ONAC's funding was
eliminated, strongly suggests that ONAC's support activities were crucial to local
noise abatement efforts.
Id. at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
Similar problems face state officials and taxpayers, who are often the victims of
"unfunded mandates." Congress is much more likely to issue commands to states and
localities than to foot the bill for nonfederal environmental controls. See, e.g., Malone,
supra note 214. Professor Malone notes that
state governments are stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to any
environmental regulation of land use. On the one hand, they confront the public
pressures for a better environment, expanding federal requirements for environmental
programs, and the need for experimentation with regional, statewide, and interstate
land use controls. On the other hand, they are confronted with decreased federal
funding, resistance from private landowners to growth restrictions, and the
inestimable risk of monetary damages for a regulatory taking.
Id. at 770.
218. See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA) § 401(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(1) (1994)
(stating congressional finding that "the presence of acidic compounds and their precursors
in the atmosphere and in deposition from the atmosphere represents a threat to natural
resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public health").
219. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.7, at 629 (2d ed.
1994) ("Groundwater monitoring and protection is the subject of a vast legal machine that
stretches across state and federal law in ways that resist comfortable understanding.").
220." See, e.g., Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994).
221. Moreover, environmental NIMBY problems, such as attempts by local
governments to use their zoning and planning powers to prevent the siting of waste
treatment and disposal facilities within their jurisdictions, often call for regional solutions.
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the safety net provided by variances' and special exceptions223 a
relatively small number of landowners will be forced to submit to
substantial or total deprivation when the challenged regulation is
environmentally based. Fourth, the harms that environmental regulations
are designed to minimize or eliminate are more likely to pose a threat to
the general community, not merely to those residing or working
nearby.224
The third and fourth challenges posed by local environmental
regulation are evocative of public nuisance. The affinity between
traditional land-use regulation and private nuisance that we can trace to
Euclid is often lacking when courts are asked to consider the impact of
environmental regulation. We can better understand the Mount Laurel
I court's Dolan-like skepticism-its refusal to defer-first when we recall
that height, area, and use regulation is the administrative version of
private nuisance and second, when we consider environmental regulation
as the regulatory analogue to, and twentieth-century legacy of, public
See, e.g., Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d
102 (Mass. 1984); Lawrence S. Bacow & James R_ Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition
to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV.
265 (1982); Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive
Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 437 (1988); Bemd Holznagel, Negotiation and
Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. RFv. 329, 337-40 (1986).
222. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 343-57; MANDELKER, supra note 125,
§§ 6.40-.52. See also SALSICH, supra note 32, §§ 5.19-.20. Salsich writes:
The zoning variance is a technique for creating exceptions to the zoning laws
when their strict application would result in special hardship to individual
landowners. ... The variance is a "safety valve" of flexibility that allows public
agencies "to bend" their rules in situations where rigid application of the rules may
have the effect of taking private property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. § 5.19 (footnote omitted).
223. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 357-62; MANDELKER, supra note 125,
§§ 6.53-.61; SALSICH, supra note 32, §§ 5.13-.18. See North Shore Steak House, Inc. v.
Board of Appeals, 282 N.E.2d 606, 609 (N.Y. 1972) ("A variance is an authority to a
property owner to use property in a manner forbidden by the ordinance while a special
exception allows the property owner to put his property to a use expressly permitted by
the ordinance.").
224. Such is the intent of modern federal environmental regulation. See, e.g.. National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994) (stating
congressional recognition of the "profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations
of all components of the natural environment" and the "critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man").
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nuisance.
Environmental law and public nuisance share not only a common
purpose (the protection of the general community from serious harms)
but also common methods of enforcement (abatement of use, fines,
criminal prosecution).225 Because of these and other shared characteris-
tics, courts and lawmakers over the past few decades have wrestled with
the issue of preemption, seeking to determine when modem environmen-
tal statutes do or should override common law protective devices." 6
The targets of English and early American public nuisance law included
pollution,227 noise, and hazardous materials 2 9 -all of which are
225. See, e.g., State v. Chicago Great W. Rail, 147 N.W. 874 (Iowa 1914) (upholding
criminal conviction for maintaining livestock pens, constituting a public nuisance);
Polsgrove v. Moss, 157 S.W. 1133 (Ky. 1913) (upholding abatement of unsafe and
unsanitary dwelling house, constituting a public nuisance); Illinois Cent. Rail v.
Commonwealth, 96 S.W. 467 (Ky. 1906) (imposing fine for allowing water to leak from
water tower and freeze on public street, constituting a public nuisance). Professor Rodgers
observes:
To a surprising degree, the legal history of the environment has been written by
nuisance law .... Nuisance actions reach pollution of all physical media-air, water,
land, groundwater-by a wide variety of means. Nuisance actions have challenged
virtually every major industrial and municipal activity that today is the subject of
comprehensive environmental regulation.... Nuisance theory and case law is the
common law backbone of modem environmental and energy law.
RODGERS, supra note 219, § 2.1, at 112-13.
226. See, e.g., Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, 226 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Or. 1963)
(holding Oregon air pollution law does not preempt state common law of nuisance and
trespass); Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Indus., 331 S.E.2d 717, 722 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding state and federal water pollution laws do not preempt state common law of
nuisance and trespass).
See also David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Lmv Citizen
Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1989). Hodas writes:
In certain instances.., state or federal environmental statutes may preempt or limit
the relief available under a state common law public nuisance cause of action. When
a plaintiff's public nuisance suit relates to airports or to nuclear facilities, the courts
have held that federal law preempts state court injunctive relief, although plaintiffs
may seek damages. The courts have also held that where interstate issues arise,
federal statutes can preempt federal common law public nuisance claims. Although
state law public nuisance suits generally are not preempted in interstate pollution
cases, the suit must be brought under the law of the state where the discharging
source is located.
Id. at 903-04 (footnotes omitted).
227. See, e.g., Rex v. White and Ward, 97 Eng. Rep. 338 (K.B. 1757) (holding it is
a public nuisance to make "acid spirit of sulfur, and thereby impregnate the air with
noisome stinks").
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the subject of contemporary comprehensive state and federal environmen-
tal regulation.230 Regardless of whether a court or legislature decides
in a specific instance that a statute or regulation takes precedence over
common law,"' the existence of a significant body of trial and appel-
late litigation on the subject provides further proof of the strong link
between public nuisance and environmental regulation.
As with private nuisance, common law and primitive statutory
controls proved inadequate to redress and, perhaps more importantly, to
prevent serious public harms. 2 State and federal lawmakers respond-
ed with the statute-based administrative systems that dominate modem
environmental law. 3  Unlike zoning and planning, however, the
primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing environmental
laws remained with central authorities, typically state and federal
228. See, e.g., Rex v. Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 795 (K.B. 1726) (holding it is a public
nuisance to "make great noises in the night with a speaking trumpet").
229. See, e.g., Rex v. Taylor, 93 Eng. Rep. 1104 (K.B. 1742) (holding it is a public
nuisance to keep large quantities of gunpowder).
230. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act (CWA)), §§ 101-
607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Federal Noise Pollution Control Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. §§ 49014918 (1994); Clean AirAct (CAA) §§ 101-618,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
231. The issue is further complicated in disputes that pit polluters in one state with
victims in another. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)
(holding Vermont common law preempted by the Clean Water Act). See also Randolph
L. Hill, Preemption of State Common Law Remedies by Federal Environmental Statutes:
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541 (1987).
232. This is not to suggest that common law controls play no role in modem
environmental law. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER El AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (1992). The authors write:
Governmental regulation at the national, state, and local levels typically
complements the legal system's common law remedies. The most significant
development in modern environmental law in the second half of the twentieth century
has been the growth in environmental statutes that take on the anticipatory, proactive
regulatory function that the common law does not.
Id. at 244.
233. The modem era of environmental law is generally traced to the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. NEPA was followed by a
succession of landmark environmental statutes in the 1970s regulating air pollution,
water pollution, solid and hazardous waste, endangered species, and drinking water
among other environmental concerns.
MALONE, supra note 212, § 1.01 (footnote omitted).
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regulatory agencies." This meant that the full panoply of state and
federal administrative law would help shape the final environmental law
product." And, because these decisions would be made at a statewide
or even national level, special interest group influence would play a
prominent role as well. 6
234. The Environmental Protection Agency carries the major responsibility for
implementing and enforcing federal environmental statutes, while state environmental
agencies play increasingly significant roles. See, e.g., DEBORAH H. JESSUP, GUIDE TO
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (2d ed. 1990). Jessup writes:
Two more years of "The New Federalism," whereby power and responsibility pass
from the federal government to state and local governments, have elapsed since the
first edition... was published in April 1988. The years have served only to deepen
the commitment of the 50 states and the District of Columbia to the management of
their own environmental programs. In fact, many new federal regulatory programs
require state action because funding from Washington simply is not there.
Id. at v.
Comprehensive federal land-use planning legislation has never materialized, although
during the heyday of federal environmental lawmaking in the early 1970s, dozens of
proposals for subsidizing state planning with federal funding were considered by Congress.
Malone notes that "the proposals would have left the actual planning process to the states."
MALONE, supra note 212, § 1.01.
235. The leading case is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415 (1971) (establishing the "hard-look" or "substantial inquiry" standard of review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-583, 701-706 (1994), for
environmental agency action). Rodgers calls Overton Park "the most frequently cited
decision in the history of environmental law." RODGERS, supra note 219, § 1.8, at 91.
Additionally, Rodgers notes that "[tihe 'substantial inquiry' or hard-look doctrine of
Overton Park has become a tenet of modem administrative law and a catechism of
environmental law." Id. § 1.8, at 93. But cf Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing a deferential standard for judicial
review of statutory interpretations by environmental agencies); Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (questioning
hard-look approach in environmental area). See generally Richard E. Levy & Richard L.
Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law
Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1989); Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution ofAdministrative Procedure, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1805 (1978); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lav and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
236. The most influential work on interest groups and their impact on administrative
law remaing Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1713 (1975) ("It has become widely accepted, not only by public
interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency
members, that the comparative over-representation of regulated or client interests in the
process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.").
There are, of course, varying interpretations of the effect and rationality of interest
group influence on the crafting of legislation, even among adherents to "public choice"
theory. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
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Counsel representing individual regulated concerns and industry
trade groups have challenged environmental statutes and regulations at
every conceivable stage, sometimes with great success." Federal
lawmakers and regulators know that given such oversight it makes little
sense to craft and implement environmental controls that (1) without
providing for exceptions, would confiscate property or halt significant
economic activity; 8 or (2) are targeted to substances or activities
where there is little or no scientific evidence indicating a significant
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). According to Farber and Frickey,
Some public choice models portray the political process as an arena of pure greed,
in which self-interested voters, avaricious politicians, and self-seeking interest groups
meet to do business. Much of the early public choice literature embraced this
viewpoint.. . . [Hlowever, recent scholarship gives us good grounds for rejecting this
model of politics as informing the content of public law. To view politics as wholly
deliberative would be quixotic, but there is (perhaps surprisingly) solid evidence that
voters and politicians are actually motivated in part by factors other than greed.
Careful statistical studies have shown that ideology-beliefs about the public interest
-- does indeed influence congressional votes.
Id. at 7. Because my point is simply that interest groups are important players in the
legislative and administrative lawmaking process, I need not choose sides in this intriguing
debate.
237. See, eg., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding
rule designating methylene diphenyl diisocyanate as a high risk pollutant under the Clean
Air Act arbitrary and capricious); Horsehead Resource Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (remanding portion of EPA rule (BIF Rule) promulgated under Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that lacked an adequate basis in the record and
gave inadequate notice and comment); AFUCIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (1 th Cir. 1992)
(holding OSHA failed to establish that permissible exposure limits (PEL) under air
contaminants standard were economically or technologically feasible); Shell Oil Co. v.
EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding EPA failed to give sufficient notice and
opportunity for comment in promulgating "mixture" and "derived-from" rules classifying
substances as hazardous wastes under RCRA); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that in promulgating final rule that prohibited asbestos
manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution under the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), EPA failed to give adequate public notice and adequate weight to language
requiring agency to promulgate the "least burdensome, reasonable regulation required to
protect environment adequately"); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that EPA failed to articulate standards or criteria for finding that quantities
of cumene entering the environment from facilities and the potential human exposure were
"substantial" pursuant to TSCA).
238. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) § 1416, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5 (1994)
(allowing exemption for compelling factors including economic problems); CAA § 125,
42 U.S.C. § 7425 (1994) (providing measures to prevent economic disruption or
unemployment).
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potential of public harm. 9
Although, unfortunately, there may be some exceptions, 240 the
same factors tend to influence and temper comprehensive environmental
regulation on the state level.24' These same administrative piocesses
and interest group realities are not generally part of the local land-use
regulatory setting, a point made most persuasively in Professor Rose's
critique of "piecemeal land controls. 2 42 Even so, because the harm of
239. See, e.g., CAA §§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994); CWA § 307, 42
U.S.C. § 1311 (1994); National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards,
40 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1995); 40 C.F.R. pts. 125, 136 (1995). For recent critiques of agencies'
abilities to determine risks with scientific certainty, see STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RSK REGULATION (1993); John S. Applegate,
Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances
Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992).
240. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)
(holding state beachfront management statute effected a total taking). See also Department
of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla.) (nursery
owner entitled to compensation for inverse condemnation resulting from state's destruction
of citrus plants), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
241. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.13, at 32-33 (3d ed.
1991) (noting the spread of state administrative procedure legislation, the majority of
which is based upon versions of the Model State Administration Procedure Act (1946,
revised in 1961 and 1981)). 1 am suggesting that many of the interest group dynamics and
procedural protections found in Washington are in place at the state level, not that federal
and state administrative law realities are identical. For a thoughtful appraisal of how state
and federal administrative processes differ, see Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Lmv in the
Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV.
95 (1982). Bonfield writes:
The practical politics and interest group diversity surrounding the operation of the
various state processes may also be different in some respects from that surrounding
the federal administrative process. While federal agencies are usually staffed by full-
time officials dedicated only to executing the functions of those agencies, many state
agencies are run by part-timers whose primary allegiance lies elsewhere. Further,
most federal agencies are not structured to ensure direct and formal representation of
interest groups affected by their actions. State agencies, on the other hand, are often
structured to accomplish that result....
In addition, state agencies are generally not as well-financed as federal agencies.
... Partly as a consequence of this underfinancing, state agencies usually cannot
obtain the quantity or quality of technical expertise and legal assistance available to
similar federal agencies. Because they are smaller, more poorly financed, and less
technically competent, state agency staffs are often characterized by somewhat less
professionalism than the staffs of most federal agencies....
Id. at 126-27 (footnotes omitted).
242. Professor Rose notes:
In a small-scale government ... there may be no clash of multiple interests leading
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a faulty or misdirected zoning decision is typically not widespread,243
and because safety nets (such as variances, special use permits,
conditional zoning, and transferable development rights) can cushion the
otherwise confiscatory blows rendered by local planning and zoning
decisionmakers,' 4 most jurisdictions continue the Euclidean tradition
and give deference to local land-use regulators.
When widespread suspicion arises concerning the legitimacy and
legality of local zoning and planning decisions-particularly approvals
to at least temporary stasis and ultimately to an adequate and careful consideration
of the public well-being. Moreover, . . . there may not be enough items of political
interest to permit the development of coalitions and the benefit-trading and mutual
forbearance they entail....
[l]n making specific piecemeal land decisions ... legislatures are restrained
neither by a coalition-building process that assures the fairness of the decisions, nor
by a clash of interests that gives time for sober consideration.
Rose, supra note 216, at 855-56 (footnotes omitted).
243. Id. at 910-Il. Professor Rose also observes:
[lit may well be that despite all the official boilerplate of health and safety (and
recently, environmental protection) in the preambles of land use controls, the most
serious spillovers or externalities of land use fall within the vague field of aesthetics:
the way the area looks, sounds, feels, smells. Reactions to matters of the senses are
likely to be limited in physical range; such externalities are most deeply felt within
the neighborhood.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see id. at 840 & n.4 (citing "criticism [that] concentrates on
the extralocal effects of local land use decisions, particularly the exclusion of low income
outsiders, and the shifting of environmental problems to neighboring communities"); Miller
v. Upper Allen Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 535 A.2d 1195 (Pa. Commw. CL 1987)
(holding landowners from neighboring locality had standing to intervene in zoning appeal);
Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1954) (allowing
neighboring localities to check effort to rezone parcel because of negative effect on
contiguous neighborhoods).
244. See supra notes 222-23 for a discussion of variances and special exceptions. For
materials on conditional zoning, see HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 283-88;
MANDELKER, supra note 125, §§ 6.64-.67; SALSICH, supra note 32, § 4.29. For
discussions on transferable development rights (TDRs), see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (noting that TDRs "undoubtedly mitigate whatever
financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants, and, for that reason, are to be taken
into account in considering the impact of regulation"); HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at
269-76; MANDELKER, supra note 125, § 11.34; SALSICH, supra note 32, § 4.28. But see
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.) (holding city's
earlier TDR scheme did not render landowner just compensation), appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976).
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of small-scale rezonings ("spot zoning")24 5-some jurisdictions have
responded by imposing administrative-law-type ("quasi-judicial")
protections. These protections are designed to ensure that local
legislative bodies articulate the reasons for their decisions and show how
the change sought by the landowner conforms with the comprehensive
plan.246 In this way, a reviewing court has more information upon
which to make its finding concerning the alleged arbitrariness of the
decision-the charge typically raised by disgruntled neighbors.247
Interestingly, Oregon, the geographical setting for Dolan, is the
jurisdiction that has led the way in viewing local government
decisionmaking in small-scale rezoning cases "as the exercise of judicial
rather than of legislative authority."248  Perhaps this explains the
majority's first reason for distinguishing Mrs. Dolan's case from
245. Professor Mandelker provides a very workable definition of spot zoning: "A
'spot zoning' is a zoning map amendment that rezones a tract of land from a less intensive
to a more intensive use district. Spot zoning comes under attack because objectors believe
it confers a zoning 'favor' on a single landowner without justification." MANDELKER,
supra note 125, § 6.28, at 248.
246. Professor Mandelker writes:
The presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative actions disappears when a
court holds a rezoning quasi-judicial, and the proponent of the zoning amendment has
the burden of proof to justify the zoning change. The legislative body must also
adopt adjudicative procedures for zoning changes and make adequate findings of fact.
See MANDELKER, supra note 125, § 6.26 at 246. See also Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,
"Spot Zoning"--A Spot That Could Be Removed From the La, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 117 (1995). Professor Rose writes:
The ["plan jurisprudence"] model first postulates that some form of plan is necessary.
Then, drawing heavily on administrative law doctrines, it regards all piecemeal
changes as "judicial" or "quasi-judicial." According to this model, then, piecemeal
land use decisions must conform to the standards set out in preexisting plans;
moreover, because the individual decision applies a general standard to a specific
instance, the decision is to be made according to adjudicative procedures.
Rose, supra note 216, at 844.
247. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). The
court stated that the quasi-judicial approach
is adequate to provide meaningful guidance for local governments making zoning
decisions and for trial courts called upon to review them.... Parties at the hearing
before the county governing body are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an
opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial in the
matter... and to a record made and adequate findings executed.
Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
248. Id. at 29.
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landowner challenges in Euclid, Pennsylvania Coal, and Agins.249
Those cases "involved essentially legislative determinations classifying
entire areas of the city, whereas [in Dolan] the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an
individual parcel. 23 0  In oral argument, counsel for the city detailed
the significant (and atypical) administrative protections afforded
landowners in Oregon's legislatively mandated comprehensive planning
and zoning structure.25'
Justice Souter took issue with the Dolan majority's departure from
"the usual rule in cases involving the police power that the government
is presumed to have acted constitutionally,, 252  and challenged
Rehnquist's characterization of Mrs. Dolan's "case as involving an
'adjudicative decision' to impose permit conditions." '253 Courts in a
majority of American jurisdictions might well agree. However, the
Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v. Board of County Commission-
ers,254 viewed these issues otherwise:
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a
specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative
authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be attacked
upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On
the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a
specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise
249. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (citing Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
250. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
251. See Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States at 39, Dolan (No. 93-518).
MR. [TIMOTHY V.] RAMIS:... The decision is made by, in the first instance, the
planning commission, and then, on appeal, to the city council. Under the law in
Oregon, this is an adjudicatory process, with all the safeguards of an impartial
decisionmaker, a decision on the record, a decision under written criteria. That
decision is then subject to review by the land use board of appeals. And a property
owner such as this one can introduce evidence at that [sic] trial level about
constitutional violations and procedural violations.
Id.
252. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2331 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 2320
n.8).
254. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
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of judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether
different test. 55
Fasano involved a challenge brought by landowners to a neighbor's
successful application for a zoning change to build a mobile home park.
Unsatisfied with the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the Fasano court
mandated procedural and substantive changes to assure that the approved
change was "in conformance with the comprehensive plan. 25 6
The Oregon justices anticipated that some critics would accuse the
court of tying the hands of local planning authorities, but found that "the
dangers of the almost irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private
economic interests on local government" '257 outweighed the dangers of
inflexible planning.258 Certainly the history of American municipal
government supports some judicial concern over local government
corruption and undue economic influence. 9 Bribery and graft in land-
use planning decisionmaking have inspired Hollywood screenwriters 6°
and finished countless political careers.6  The Oregon approach is but
one attempt to counter these real and "almost irresistible pressures. 262
Our glance backward from the perspective of Dolan at these judicial
and legislative attempts to counterbalance undue pressure by land
developers yields an important insight. In the eyes of a court considering
255. Id. at 26.
256. Id. at 27-28. See also Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with the Comprehensive
Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
257. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30.
258. Id. While Oregon courts refuse to apply the Fasano standard in cases in which
the landowner seeking a zoning change loses, such is not the case universally. See, e.g.,
Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 137 (Kan. 1978).
259. See, e.g., JOHN A. GARDINER & THEODORE R. LYMAN, DECISIONS FOR SALE:
CORRUPTION IN LAND-USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1978); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF
ZONING REFORMS: MINIMIZING THE INCENTIVE FOR CORRUPTION (1979) [hereinafter
NATIONAL INSTITUTE].
260. See, e.g., AGAINST ALL ODDS (Columbia Pictures 1984); CHINATOWN (Long
Road Productions 1974).
261. See FRANK J. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFORM 52 (1981) ("Zoning
and subdivision regulation have traditionally been the greatest single source of corruption
in local govemmenL Zoning personnel rarely constitute even 2 percent of a city govern-
ment's work force, but zoning scandals seem to account for nearly half the convictions of
local officials.").
262. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 259.
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a landowner challenge to land-use regulation, local governments can be
"captured" by environmental, anti-development interests as well as by
pro-development forces. 3  The Dolan majority's concern about
regulators' motives is best represented by Chief Justice Rehnquist's
reference to the California Coastal Commission's attempt to gain lateral
public access to the Nollans' beach property as "simply trying to obtain
an easement through gimmickry."2'" Moreover, the Dolan Court's
demanding actions-rejecting the most lax state standard for measuring
the validity of local government exactions and subjecting Tigard officials
to the "rough proportionality" test265-speak much louder than the
Justices' supportive words: "No such gimmicks are associated with the
permit conditions imposed by [Tigard] in this case."2" Much like the
Fasano court was concerned about local officials bowing to undue
economic pressure, the Dolan Court seemed worried that the Tigard City
Planning Commission may have been so anxious to realize an agenda
that included public open spaces and alternative forms of transportation
that it overlooked the legitimate grievances of the landowner who would
bear the brunt of its regulatory decision.
Dolan's use of elevated judicial scrutiny to solve Tigard's possible
overindulgence of public needs and desires mirrors the approach taken
by state courts in Mt. Laurel I and Fasano to combat an undesirable
government agenda (socioeconomic exclusion) and municipal corruption.
These are not the only examples of judicial and legislative attempts to
redress local government excesses.
Other checks on local government abuse exist. First, the Constitu-
tion requires balancing or elevated scrutiny when the challenged land-use
263. In her discussion of Stewart's notion of "interest representation," see Stewart,
supra note 236, Professor Rose noted this possibility:
Interest representation proposals normally attempt to counteract the "capture" of the
regulators by the regulated interest; in the land use area, "capture" arguments usually
refer to the undue influence on the local government that developers and real estate
interests may exercise to the exclusion of other interested citizens, although the
developers may regard the local council as the "captive" of an implacably
antidevelopment majority.
Rose, supra note 216, at 897 (footnotes omitted).
264. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
266. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
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regulation has a negative impact on first amendment protections 67 or
other constitutionally recognized rights,268 or discriminates on the basis
of a suspect classification.269 Second, legislation exists that selectively
(especially to protect environmentally sensitive regions of the state)27
or, in a few cases, on a statewide basis,27' returns significant planning
and zoning power to a central authority.272 Third, state statutes and
267. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that the
statutory delegation of a governmental power to a religious institution-the ability to veto
alcoholic beverage licenses-violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause); Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding locality's live entertainment
ban violated First Amendment free speech protections).
268. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977)
(determining that Euclidean deference is inappropriate for a city zoning provision that
defined families too narrowly).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding city liable for intentional racial discrimination for practices that included using
zoning power to preserve segregated neighborhoods), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
Localities engaging in arbitrary and irrational land-use regulation can also be checked
under minimal review standards. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding that city failed rational basis test when it required a
special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded).
270. See, e.g., MALONE, supra note 212, §§ 13.01-.04 (discussing "Critical Area
Regulations," including programs in Florida (Administration Commission designates
critical areas), New Jersey (Pinelands Commission), New York (Adirondack Park Agency),
and Virginia (Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board)). See Florida Environmental Land
& Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.12 (West 1988 & Supp.
1995); Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.18A-1 to -49 (West 1991 & Supp.
1995); Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 800-820 (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1996); Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2116
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1995).
271. One ofthe most ambitious programs, embodied in the Oregon Land Use Planning
Act of 1973, OR. REV. STAT. §§.197.005-.860 (1991 & Supp. 1994), determined the
contours of the Dolan dispute. See GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE
REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON
(1992); Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An
Implementation Review and Lessons from Other States, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,367 (1992). See also Wickersham, supra note 121, at 490, 522-23 (explaining that the
Oregon statute, which "served as the model for a second wave of state growth manage-
ment statutes adopted from the mid-1980s through 1993," differs from previous schemes
in that it "relies on state oversight of local planning and zoning, rather than on direct state
or regional regulation of major projects or critical areas").
272. The classic treatment of state and regional planning schemes is FRED BOSSELMAN
& DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). For the
early history of the "recapture by state government of its power to regulate land
development," see MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 248-54 (1976) (commentary on article 7).
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regulations exist that are designed to combat exclusionary zoning and to
force recalcitrant municipalities to implement inclusionary devices such
as mandatory set-asides and density bonuses.273 Fourth, state and
federal regulatory takings case law may invalidate or make cost-
prohibitive confiscatory local regulations. 4 It is to this last factor that
we now turn our attention, as we examine a pivotal regulatory takings
case through the lens provided by Dolan and Lucas.
VI. THE KEYS TO KEYSTONE: WHOLE PARCELS
AND NEW KNOWLEDGE
More than six decades intervened between the Supreme Court's
consideration of the legitimacy of two Pennsylvania statutory responses
to coal mine subsidence-the Kohler Act,275 invalidated by the Court
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922,276 and the Subsidence
Act,27 7 upheld by the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass' v.
DeBenedictis in 1987.27 During that interim, state and federal regula-
tors confronted a significant body of evidence regarding the harms posed
to the public by coal mining that is conducted in close proximity to
residences and commercial uses. 279 Following passage of the Federal
Recent contributions to the growing literature on the subject include JOHN M. DEGROVE,
PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES (1992); STATE AND REGIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING: IMPLEMENTING NEW METHODS FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT
(Peter A. Buschbaum & Larry J. Smith eds., 1993); David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution
Revisited: A Quarter Century of Progress, 26 URB. LAW. 197 (1994).
273. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65580-65589.3, 65915-65918 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995) (recognizing housing element in comprehensive plans; density bonuses and
other inclusionary devices); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1994 &
Supp, 1995) (citing provisions regarding low and moderate income housing, commonly
referred to as the "Anti-Snob Zoning Act'); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.27D-301 to -329 (West
1986 & Supp. 1995) (describing Fair Housing Act that sets up Council on Affordable
Housing to promulgate and enforce statutory and Mt. Laurel mandates). Cf United States
v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (modifying trial court's broad remedy in
federal Fair Housing Act case involving an egregious pattern of racial discrimination), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1012 (1982).
274. In addition to Lucas and Nollan, see the successful takings challenges cited infra,
notes 294 and 366.
275. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
276. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
277. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-1407 (Purdon Supp. 1995).
278. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
279. Id. at 473-76, 485-94.
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Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)28° and its
accompanying regulations,2"' Pennsylvania expanded the reach of its
restrictions on mining that were "designed to minimize subsidence in
certain areas." '282
Although four Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, could see no
meaningful (that is, outcome-determinative) distinction between the two
Pennsylvania coal-mining statutes,283 the majority thought other-
wise.2 In a carefully drawn opinion that serves as a paradigm for
future regulatory takings cases where it is necessary to adjudge the
validity of comprehensive, expert-based, federal and state environmental
restrictions, Justice Stevens distinguished Pennsylvania Coal in two key
ways:
First, unlike the Kohler Act, the character of the governmental
action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it
perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare. Second,
there is no record in this case to support a finding, similar to the
one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act
makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their
business, or that there has been undue interference with their
investment-backed expectations.285
The Court's attention to two key factors-the intensity of the perceived
public harm and the degree of diminution of private property inter-
ests-derives from a line of regulatory takings cases that concern not
only comprehensive federal and state environmental regulations of land
use,286 but also concern local planning and zoning regulations. 87
280. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). See Keystone, 480 U.S. 476-77 n.6.
281. Surface Coal Mining & Reclamation Operations, 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902 (1979).
282. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485; see id. at 476-77 n.6.
283. See id. at 508-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Examination of the relevant factors
presented here convinces me that the differences between them and those in Pennsylvania
Coal verge on the trivial.").
284. See id. at 481 (Stevens, J.) ("Although there are some obvious similarities
between the cases, we agree with the Court of Appeals and the District Court that the
similarities are far less significant than the differences, and that Pennsylvania Coal does
not control this case.").
285. Id. at 485.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985) (wetlands); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
295-96 (1981) (coal mining). See also Wolf, supra note 22, at 498-500 (identifying these
two factors with Holmes's majority and Brandeis's dissenting opinions in Pennsylvania
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The Keystone Court's direct source for these factors is Agins v. City
of Tiburon,2s8 a 1980 case that addressed the legitimacy of an open-
space ordinance." 9 Justice Lewis F. Powell, speaking for the Court,
noted, "The application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land., 29
In two subsequent, successful takings challenges, the Agins test
reached beyond its original turf of a local government's "general zoning
law." 29' The Nollan majority, considering the coastal commission's
conditional approval of a landowner's construction plans, applied the
two-factor test to "land use regulation" by local and regional planning
officials.292 Similarly, the Court in Lucas employed the Agins frame-
work to evaluate a state's environmentally based beachfront protection
scheme.2 93
State and federal courts have taken Scalia's lead and applied the
Agins formulation in lawsuits that challenge a wide range of land-use and
environmental regulations.29 It is probably too late to reconsider the
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
287. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 628
(1981) (open-space ordinance); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980) (open-
space ordinance).
288. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S.
at 260).
289. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
290. Id. at 260.
291. See Wolf, supra note 22, at 478-79 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
292. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) ("land use
regulation").
293. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-95 (1992)
(applying the Agins test to find a taking when the owner was forced to sacrifice "all
economically beneficial ... use[s]" of his property).
294. In the months following the Lucas decision, several state and federal courts
applied the Agins formulation in a variety of land-use and environmental regulatory takings
settings. The courts in the following cases refused to find that the challenged regulations
effected a taking: Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800-02 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Corps of Engineers order to suspend construction activities until permit granted); Outdoor
Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 615-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordinances restricting
billboard placement); Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 164-
65 (9th Cir. 1993) (city agreement with county to reject plans for urban development in
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county areas covered by city's general plan); O'Connor v. Corps of Engineers, 801 F.
Supp. 185, 197-98 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (Corps of Engineers denial of permit to fill wetlands
and order to return filled wetlands to original condition); Tahoe Keys Property Owners'
Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734 (Cal. Ct. App.) (refusal
to enjoin challenged regulation conditioning building permits on payment of mitigation fee
prior to trial of takings issue), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994); People ex reL. Dep't of
Transp. v. Diversified Properties Co. III, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
("de facto taking" prior to eminent domain action); Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of
Hinsdale, 617 N.E.2d 1227, 1242-46 (11. App. Ct.) (rezoning of lot to increase minimum
size for development), cert. denied, 622 N.E.2d 1229 (111. 1993); Offen v. County Council,
625 A.2d 424, 431-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (denial of sewer upgrade permit and
subsequent rezoning of property to preclude commercial development), rev'd on other
grounds, 639 A.2d 1070 (Md. 1994); Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 N.E.2d 1269,
1273-77 (Mass. 1992) (city rent control board's refusal to allow sale of individual
condominium units), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2338 (1993); Kelly v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1032-35 (Nev. 1993) (denial of permits to construct
single-family homes based on criteria designed to protect water quality of Lake Tahoe),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 684 (1994); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of
Bemardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1381-90 (NJ. 1992) (ordinance imposing licensing
requirements for quarry operations and limiting depth below which land could not be
quarried); Patzau v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 638 A.2d 866, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.) (restrictions on development in "airport safety zones"), cert. denied, 649 A.2d 1288
(N.J. 1994); Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608, 613-17 (Or. 1993) (en banc)
(denial of conditional use permit to construct single-family home in forestry zone); Stevens
v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 458-59 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (denial of permit to
build seawall), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 634 A.2d
245, 247-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (conviction for maintaining 95-foot tall Dairy Queen
sign penetrating airport approach airspace); Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 421 S.E.2d 210,
212-14 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (contempt sanctions for failure to bring property into
compliance with building code); MeFillan v. Berkeley County Planning Comm'n, 438
S.E.2d 801, 809-10 (W. Va. 1993) (refusal to allow expansion of mobile home park).
In the following cases, takings were found: Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28
F.3d 1171, 1178-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Corps of Engineers order prohibiting construction
on wetlands); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 44-46 (Cl. Ct. 1994) (denial of
permit to fill wetlands to install sewer system); Moroney v. Mayor of Old Tappan, 633
A.2d 1045, 1047-48 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (denial of hardship variance from
zoning requirements), cert. denied, 642 A.2d 1004 (N.J. 1994).
See also Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631-34 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (government
blocked wetlands reclamation project; temporary takings claim barred by statute of
limitations and permanent takings case remanded); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of
Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549-50 (11 th Cir.) (zoning commission's reinterpretation
of ordinance resulting in premature expiration of zoning designation), vacated en banc, 42
F.3d 626 (11th Cir. 1994); Carpenter v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp.
1316, 1325-27 (D. Nev. 1992) (authority's eight-month moratorium on new construction
banning single family residential use; landowner's as-applied takings claim survived
summary judgment); Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071, 1072-74 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (case remanded to determine if department's filing of mpp of
reservation deprived owner of economic use), afj'd, 640 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994) (per
curiam); Galbraith v. Planning Dep't, 627 N.E.2d 850, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (action
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expansion of the Agins test; and it would not be an easy task to limit the
test to one "genus" of regulation. Efforts to distinguish environmental
regulation from land-use planning often prove wanting. For example,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor opined that two distinct forms of
regulation are at work: "Land use planning in essence chooses particular
uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate
particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is
used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits." 295
Justice Powell was not alone in the skepticism evident in his observation
that the Court's "distinction is one without a rational difference." 2"
Even if we choose not to engage in fine line-drawing, we can note
that local Euclidean and post-Euclidean297 zoning devices rarely
encounter difficulty with the Agins substantial advancement prong,
particularly when such regulation is specifically authorized by state
zoning enabling acts.' Even the Dolan Court in its "essential nexus"
challenging rezoning of property as floodway deemed premature); Woodbury Place
Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 260-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (case
remanded to determine economic impact of two-year moratorium on development of land
zoned for commercial use), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2929 (1993); Powers v. Skagit County,
835 P.2d 230, 236-39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (denial of permit to build in floodway;
remanded for a determination of whether economically viable use remained).
295. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987). This
was a nontakings case involving federal preemption of a coastal permit requirement.
296. Id. at 603 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id.
at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that land-use laws are preempted
but concluding that "the permit [the challenged state] statute requires Granite Rock to
obtain is a land use control device"); Eric T. Freyfogle, Granite Rock: Institutional
Competence and the State Role in Federal Land Planning, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 487
(1988) ("Down the road courts will have trouble with this distinction, unless the Court
literally limits the land use category to those exceedingly few statutes that prescribe
particular uses for parcels of federal land."); John D. Leshy, Granite Rock and the States'
Influence Over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL. L. 99, 103 (1987) (noting the "slipperiness
of the distinction").
297. Professor Haar and I use this term to describe planning and zoning
approaches [that] often involve landowners and regulators in a bargaining process that
results in permission to develop above and beyond established limits (TDR
[transferable development rights], conditional zoning), the provision of public
amenities (incentive zoning), the elimination of harmful spillovers and unimaginative
rigidity (performance standards), and the integration of traditionally segregated uses
(mixed-use development, PUD [planned unit development]).
HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 256.
298. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) is the antecedent for the great
bulk of state zoning legislation. SZEA includes among the "Purposes in View" for local
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analysis acknowledged that Tigard's flood prevention and traffic
reduction goals were "legitimate public purposes."2  In the event local
regulations stray too far from the letter and spirit of state law, they are
invalidated under ultra vires principles.3"
Although landowner litigants frequently include "total takings"
claims in their pleadings, the second Agins prong-prohibiting govern-
ment action that deprives the private user of all economically viable
use-is rarely violated in the local land-use planning and zoning context
for three major reasons. First, local ordinances typically include safety
nets such as variances and special exceptions, devices that effectively
shield local governments from claims of confiscatory regulation."'
Second, planning-based Euclidean and post-Euclidean zoning
devices are designed to segregate and manage discordant uses-not to
abate them outright. In those comparatively rare instances in which local
planning and zoning decisionmakers have crossed the line that divides
reasonable from arbitrary and confiscatory confiscation, state and federal
courts have reacted by outlawing the offending restrictions or by forcing
local governments to compensate the victims.3"
zoning the following legitimate state interests: lessening street congestion, securing fire
safety, promoting health and general welfare, and preventing overcrowding. U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALI-
TIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (recommended 1926) [hereinafter SZEA],
reprinted in 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING app. A (Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. ed., 4th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1995).
299. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2317-18 (1994).
300. See, e.g., Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 128 A.2d 473, 478-79 (N.J. 1957)
(invalidating overly discretionary zoning ordinance as ultra vires and contrary to spirit of
enabling act).
301. See supra notes 222-23, 244, and accompanying text. See also Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985)
(involving landowner who failed to seek variances from zoning and subdivision ordinances
before bringing regulatory takings claim). In Dolan, the City Planning Commission denied
the landowner's variance requests from the standards contained in the Community
Development Code. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. In Lucas, after the landowner filed his
legal challenge, the state legislature passed an amendment to the Beachfront Management
Act that "authorize[d] the Council, in certain circumstances, to issue 'special permits' for
the construction or reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline." Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890-91 (1992). The majority
rejected the Council's argument that because Lucas might still be able to obtain permission
the case was unripe. Id. at 2891-92.
302. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane)
(holding that plaintiff was entitled to monetary damages owing to ordinance restricting
development in Hillside Conservation Area); Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H.
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The third reason why local planning and zoning regulations rarely
effect a total deprivation, unlike the first two, is the subject of consider-
able debate among jurists and commentators. Courts in regulatory
takings cases have generally followed the parcel-as-a-whole approach
articulated by Justice William Brennan in the Penn Central majority
opinion: -"3
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole
304
Because a court under this method considers the economic effect of the
challenged regulation on the entire parcel, even a drastic reduction in
overall value can survive takings scrutiny.05
Not all jurists agree with Brennan's dismissal of what Professor
Radin calls "conceptual severance," that is, "delineating a property
interest consisting of just what the government action has removed from
the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been
permanently taken."3" The most significant opponent of the parcel-as-
a-whole approach is Chief Justice Rehnquist, who, in dissent, considered
the air rights above Grand Central Terminal in Penn Central0 7 and the
1981) (holding that inclusion of property in conservation zone constituted a regulatory
taking that entitled owner to damages); Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon,
121 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1954) (declaring invalid and void confiscatory zoning ordinance as
applied); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1938) (invalidating
confiscatory zoning ordinance as applied).
303. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
304. Id. at 130-31.
305. See, e.g., id. at 131 (citing "75% diminution in value" caused by the zoning law
in Euclid, and "87 1/2% diminution in value" in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915)). But see Norman Williams & Holly Emst, And Now We Are Here on a Darkling
Plain, 13 VT. L. REV. 635, 660 n.62 (figuring Hadacheck reduction to be 92.5%). See
also William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979)
(involving 95% reduction in value), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
306. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
307. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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coal companies' "coal in place" and support estate in Keystone30 8 as
the discrete private property interests that were depleted, if not confiscat-
ed, by local and state regulators.
There are signs in the Supreme Court's latest takings decisions that
this issue is far from resolved. In footnote seven of his opinion for the
majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia laments that the "uncertainty regarding
the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has
produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court."3"
In Dolan, while the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of Tigard's
regulation of development in the floodplain, the city had not demonstrat-
ed "why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required
in the interest of flood control. 3 10  Indeed, the distinction between a
public and private easement was crucial to Mrs. Dolan's case: "The
difference to petitioner, of course, is the loss of her ability to exclude
others. As we have noted, this right to exclude others is 'one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property.' 31' Chief Justice Rehnquist thus placed special
emphasis on Tigard's "eviscerat[ion" 3 2 of Mrs. Dolan's right to
exclude the public from the Greenway. It would be hard, to use Scalia's
terminology, to reduce the denominator in the deprivation fraction even
further than this.
Those responsible for drafting and implementing comprehensive
state and federal environmental regulations should rarely encounter
308. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 518-20 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
309. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
310. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994).
311. Id. (quoting Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
312. Id. at 2321. Where parties claim that essential strands in the bundle of property
rights have been taken, the Supreme Court's treatment has been a bit erratic. See Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987) (holding a federal statute that substituted escheat
for descent and devise of fractional interests in allotted Native American lands effected a
taking); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.) (noting
property owners seeking to exclude students distributing political materials "failed to
demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value
of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking'); Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (holding federal regulations prohibiting the sale of
Native American artifacts was not a taking just because the government destroyed one
strand in bundle of property rights); Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (holding federal
government could not deprive petitioner of right to exclude public from coastal pond
without compensation).
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problems with the first Agins prong, given the substantial protections
provided by the federal Administrative Procedure Act and its state
analogues and the watchdog function performed by regulated industries
and trade groups. 3 The second prong-the deprivation of all viable
use-is a more likely challenge, given the availability of abatement in
the regulatory arsenal.3"4
Still, even if they face a judicial finding of total deprivation
(whether or not the parcel-as-a-whole approach is used), defenders of the
restriction should be able to demonstrate that this harm-based provi-
sion3 . is a modern, regulatory analogue of public nuisance. Under the
Lucas nuisances-plus exception,3"6 government counsel can convince
the courts that they are appraising, in effect, redundant regulation by
providing a direct link between the regulation and the prevention or
abatement of significant harm to the general public. This is true not only
when there is a related nuisance law in the relevant code, 17 but also,
to use Scalia's formulation, when "changed circumstances or new know]-
313. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1994) ("[Interior] Secretary ... shall
immediately order a cessation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations....");
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1994) ("[EPA] Administrator is authorized to commence a
civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction .... );
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994) (authorizing EPA Administrator to "commence a civil
action for a permanent or temporary injunction"); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994)
(authorizing Attorney General to "abate ... danger or threat" posed by "actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance"). Cf Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States,
18 Cl. Ct. 394 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (stating that the mere enactment of SMCRA deprived mining
company of all economic use), affd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 406 (1991).
315. Hann-based provisions are a requirement of many federal and state environmental
statutes. See infia Table I.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
317. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.04 (Anderson 1993).
No person shall cause pollution or place or cause to be placed any sewage,
industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any
waters of the state, and any such action is hereby declared to be a public nuisance,
except in such cases where the director of environmental protection has issued a valid
and unexpired permit, or renewal thereof, ... or an application for renewal is
pending.
Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-422 (West 1995) ("[P]ollution of the waters
of the state... is a public nuisance.. . . "); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.021(1) (West 1993)
("The pollution of the air and waters of this state... creates public nuisances .... ).
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edge may make what was previously permissible no longer so. ' 18
Keystone is a quintessential "changed circumstances or new
knowledge" case. Justice Stevens cited several pieces of evidence
indicating that the Kohler Act was intended not as a health or safety
measure, but as an act that "served only private interests." 3t 9  In
contrast, the Subsidence Act was designed "to protect the public interest
in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area."' 2 The
Court opined,
That private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the
Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate activity
akin to a public nuisance. The Subsidence Act is a prime example
that "circumstances may so change in time ... as to clothe with
such a [public] interest what at other times ... would be a matter
of purely private concern." 321
While Keystone preceded Lucas by five years, Pennsylvania's Subsidence
Act-like other comprehensive environmental schemes-is a fitting
candidate for the nuisance exception (although the majority's finding that
the deprivation was far less-than-total would have obviated the need to
apply that exception). z
Table I demonstrates that, even if one of the federal environmental
schemes listed effects a total deprivation, there should be no problem
fitting within the Lucas exception. For in these and other environmental
statutes 3' direct links exist between the operative provisions of the
318. Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt,
g (1977)).
319. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
414 (1922)).
320. Id. at 488.
321. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)).
322. See Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2899.
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
323. Lucas's reliance on nuisance law, particularly public nuisance law with its
emphasis on harm to the community, reflects the anthropocentric (that is, human-centered)
view of law and legal institutions, a view that is rejected as too narrow by many
environmentalists. See, e.g., PHILLIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993). Shabecoff writes:
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There is a wing of the modem environmental movement that insists that people
have an ethical duty to protect nature whether or not it serves human needs. I take
a more anthropocentric view. Human welfare is our first priority. But I am deeply
sympathetic to those who insist that all nature has a right to exist for its own sake.
Id. at xii-xiv. Cf BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY 66-67 (1985). The
authors note:
In keeping with the spiritual traditions of many of the world's religions, the deep
ecology norm of self-realization goes beyond the modem Western self which is
defined as an isolated ego striving primarily for hedonistic gratification or for a
narrow sense of individual salvation in this life or the next.... [T]he deep ecology
sense of self requires... an identification which goes beyond humanity to include
the nonhuman world ....
* This process of full unfolding of the self can also be summarized by the
phrase, "No one is saved until we are all saved," where the phrase "one" includes not
only me, an individual human, but all humans, whales, grizzly bears, whole rain
forest ecosystems, mountains and rivers, the tiniest microbes in the soil, and so on.
The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal
right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and
self-realization within the larger Self-realization. The basic intuition is that all
organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal
in intrinsic worth ....
Id.
While, as Table I indicates, the direct links between human health and safety in most
federal environmental statutes are undeniable, the connection is less explicit in biodiversity
statutes, particularly the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its
Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 570 (1993) (calling the ESA "the core federal biodiversity
protection program"). The ESA, in its list of findings, recites that "these species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1994).
Not surprisingly, there are some solid, though unarticulated, anthropocentric reasons for
preserving plant and animal species. See, e.g., Andrew A. Smith et al., The Endangered
Species Act at Twenty: An Analytical Survey of Federal Endangered Species Protection,
33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1027 (1993). The authors state:
The many rationales for preserving species generally fall into four categories: direct
economic uses, ecological services, aesthetic benefits, and moral and ethical duties.
Plant and animal species are valuable as sources of food, medicines, and other
commodities, helping to support a surprisingly broad range of economic activities.
... Some species yield substances critical for medicinal purposes. Laboratory studies
involving plant and animal species help develop human vaccines and organ
transplants, and greatly advance health and other sciences....
. The millions of wild plant and animal species interact in natural ecosystems
to offer subtle, yet valuable, ecological services. Natural ecosystems, such as
marshes, grasslands, and forests, convert carbon dioxide into oxygen, purify water,
stabilize and fertilize soils, control climates, and provide habitat for species of direct
economic value. ...
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Another homocentric basis for preserving species arises when society ascribes value
to species for their beauty, uniqueness, or complexity....
Moral and ethical arguments for preserving species follow two lines of reasoning.
The first argument, that it is wrong to leave future generations a biologically
impoverished world, views wild plants and animals as a trust. ... Although it
increases the range of reasons for preventing species extinction, the trust rationale
does little more than add a temporal element to homocentric arguments for preserving
species.
A second preservation argument based in morality abandons the homocentric bias
and postulates that species have an inherent right to exist, independent of their value
to humans....
Id. at 1030-33 (footnotes omitted). After Lucas, defenders of the ESA and other
biodiversity laws who hope to survive a regulatory takings challenge in which total
deprivation is alleged, should seriously consider two alternatives: (1) restructuring statutes
and regulations so that potentially confiscatory prohibitions and proscriptions are
"triggered" by demonstrations that human health and safety are at risk, or (2) finding
precedent for the use of public nuisance to protect nonhuman life for its own sake.
The first option entails more than redrafting prefatory language. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2898 n.12. Scalia writes:
In Justice Blackmun's view, even with respect to regulations that deprive an owner
of all developmental or economically beneficial land uses, the test for required
compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing justification for
its action. Since such ajustification can be formulated in practically every case, this
amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings
Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing
characterizations.
Id. (citation omitted). It does not seem likely that courts will soon adopt what Professor
Sax calls an "ecological view of property," in which we appreciate undeveloped "[I]and
[as] already at work, performing important services in its unaltered state." Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1442 (1993). Moreover, the reality of Americanjurisprudence and politics is that human, individual rights are elevated over ecosystemic
rights. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the
Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 911, 917-18 (1994) (discussing "significant
obstacles [that] must be confronted before biodiversity can be elevated to a position of
primacy on the natural resources policy agenda"). Therefore, advocates of biodiversity
statutes would do well to respond to the special vulnerability of such statutes to regulatory
takings challenges, by "seek[ing] adaptive solutions to avoid excessive regulation of
private uses." Sax, supra, at 1455; see Susan Shaheen, Comment, The Endangered
Species Act: Inadequate Species Protection in the Wake of the Destruction of Private
Property Rights, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 453, 472-74 (1994). See also Craig A. Arnold,
Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered
Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (1991) (discussing
Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) required of developers who seek incidental taking
permits under ESA § 10(a)); Tarlock, supra, at 605-13 (discussing first- and second-
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scheme, as implemented through regulations324 and case law,325 and
generation HCPs); Shaheen, supra, at 474-76 (discussing mitigation fees and "ecosystem-
wide" management).
The second option features its own pitfalls. See Shaheen, supra, at 472 ("It is unlikely,
in light of the Lucas opinion, that ESA protection of endangered species will be sufficient
to qualify under the traditional public nuisance exception.'). One commentator has
somewhat optimistically asserted that, "[i]f the killing of wildlife by pollution and
contamination of its habitat is a public nuisance, then any threat to an endangered species
or its habitat must also be considered a public nuisance." Paula C. Murray, Private
Takings of Endangered Species as Public Nuisance: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council and the Endangered Species Act, 12 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 159
(1993). The two cases cited in support of this assertion were late twentieth century cases,
and hence, not instances in which the court could trace the type of public nuisance to pre-
Fifth Amendment common law. Id. (citing Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. Va. 1981) and State ex reL Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo.
1980)). But see John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern
Takings Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996). Cf. Patricia A. Hageman, Fifth
Amendment Takings Issues Raised by Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 375, 387 (1994) ("A possible [government] argument for application of
the exception to the ESA is that the government holds endangered wildlife as a public trust
resource, and that harm to such public trust property is a tortious invasion of public
rights.").
324. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 725.2 (1994) (stating that it is the policy of the Water
Resources Council to "provide leadership in floodplain management and the protection of
wetlands," as well as take action to "[m]inimize the impact of floods on human health,
safety and welfare"); Guidelines for the Land Disposal of Solid Waste, 40 C.F.R.
§ 241.101(g) (1994) (defining "hazardous waste" as "any waste or combination of wastes
which pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or living organisms
because such wastes are nondegradable or persistent in nature or because they can be
biologically magnified, or ... lethal, or ... may otherwise cause or tend to cause
detrimental cumulative effects"); Corrective Action Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 280.66(b) (1994)
(stating that plan submitted by owners and operators of underground storage tanks will
only be approved if it "adequately protect[s] human health, safety, and the environment");
The Hazard Ranking System (HRS), 40 C.F.R. app. A pt. 300 (1994) (stating that the
HRS, which is used to place sites on the National Priorities List under CERCLA, "serves
as a screening device to evaluate the potential for releases of uncontrolled hazardous
substances to cause human health or environmental damage"); 40 C.F.R. § 761.20 (1993)
(stating that the TSCA restrictions on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are "based upon
the well-documented human health and environmental hazard of PCB exposure, the high
probability of human and environmental exposure to PCBs and PCB Items from
manufacturing, processing, or distribution activities").
325. See, e.g., Ohio Power Co. v. EPA, 729 F.2d 1096, 1097 (6th Cir.) (quoting
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 910 (1978)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984). The Ohio Power court stated:
This court's basic rationale for its approval of the EPA's air quality standards was
(and remains) concern about human health and safety. In our earlier Cleveland
Electric decision, we said:
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the undeniably public-nuisance goals of protecting human health and
safety. Moreover, if any value does remain in the affected property, a
fortiori, the challenged regulation will pass Penn Central's less-
demanding, ad hoc, multi-factor test. 26
The major problems faced by those designing and defending
regulations that affect the use of real property come in the shadowy area
located between traditional land-use planning and zoning and comprehen-
sive environmental regulation. Populating this "twilight zone" are local,
regional, and state environmental regulations that may be designed
without significant expert input, promulgated in the absence of significant
administrative law protections, or enforced without sufficient protections
against abuse.
Indeed, one of the key successful Supreme Court takings challenges
of the past decade was launched against a creature from this twilight
zone-the California Coastal Commission's requirement that the Nollans
grant the public a beach-access easement in return for permission to
expand their beach house.327  The Commission3 28 was unable to
The federal Clean Air Act program which produced these standards is based
primarily upon the adverse effect which air pollution has upon human life and
health.
Acute episodes of high pollution have clearly resulted in mortality and
morbidity. Often the effects of high pollutant concentrations in these episodes
have been combined with other environmental features such as low temperatures
or epidemic diseases (influenza) which may in themselves have serious or fatal
consequences. This has sometimes made it difficult to determine to what extent
pollution and temperature extremes are responsible for the effects. Nevertheless,
there is now no longer any doubt that high levels of pollution sustained for periods
of days can kill. Those aged 45 and over with chronic diseases, particularly of the
lungs or heart, seem to be predominantly affected. In addition to these acute
episodes, pollutants can attain daily levels which have been shown to have serious
consequences to city dwellers.
Id.
326. The Penn Central Court explained:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions have
identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted).
327. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827-28 (1987).
328. The membership of the sixteen-person Commission is detailed in CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30301 (West 1996).
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convince the Court that new or expanded residential construction was in
any way related to the need for public lateral access to the private
beaches along the California coast.329 In fact, the Nollan majority
could not find even the merest rational relationship between the
dedication requirement and the legitimate goals of the Commission in its
regulation of activities affecting the coastal zone.33 The Court's
impatience with the Commission's proffered environmental concerns
reminds us of the Mount Laurel I court's skepticism concerning the
environmental cloak under which New Jersey suburbs sought to hide
their exclusionary practices.33" '
Some purely local regulatory schemes with an environmental flavor
seem to have no private-nuisance pedigree, such as no- and slow-growth
In the past few years the Commission has been rocked by scandal and controversy. See,
e.g., Paul Jacobs & Mark Gladstone, Nathanson Gets Nearly 5 Years for Extortion:
Former State Coastal Commissioner is Sentenced for Soliciting Bribes from People
Seeking Construction Permits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at A3 ("In June, the 54-year-old
Beverly Hills real estate broker admitted soliciting almost $1 million in bribes from those
seeking building permits from the commission, including Hollywood figures such as actor
Sylvester Stallone, producers Irwin Winkler and Blake Edwards, and agent-producer Sandy
Gallin."); Jeffrey L. Rabin, New Appointee Named Chairman of Coastal Panel; Politics:
Some Members Allege Back-Room Deal in Choice of Embattled Speaker Willie Brown's
Ally; Board Later OK's Controversial Gaviota Development, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994,
at A3; Ron Russell & Mark Gladstone, Proposal for Ethics Reform on Coastal Panel
Rejected; Politics: Assembly Committee Turns Down Hayden Bill that Would Curb the
Ability of Commissioners to Accept Funds from Those with Business Before the Body,
Proposal for Ethics Reform on Coastal Panel Rejected, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at A3.
329. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
330. The majority stated:
The Commission claims ... that we may sustain the condition at issue here by
finding that it is reasonably related to the public need or burden that the Nollans'
new house creates or to which it contributes. We can accept, for purposes of
discussion, the Commission's proposed test as to how close a "fit" between the
condition and the burden is required, because we find that this case does not meet
even the most untailored standards.
Id. at 838. See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). The Dolan
Court noted:
If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection
between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development. We
were not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that the
connection did not meet even the loosest standard.
Id.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 204-11.
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plans332 and aesthetic controls.333 Although the modem trend is to
uphold such schemes in the face of facial and ultra vires challenges,33 4
332. The classic growth control cases remain Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1975) ("At the heart of the allocation procedure is
an intricate point system, whereby a builder accumulates points for conformity by his
projects with the City's general plan and environmental design plans, for good architectural
design, and for providing low and moderate income dwelling units and various recreational
facilities.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); and Golden v. Planning
Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 302 (N.Y.) ("Ramapo asks not that it be left alone, but only that it
be allowed to prevent the kind of deterioration that has transformed well-ordered and
thriving residential communities into blighted ghettos with attendant hazards to health,
security and social stability ... .") (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
333. On aesthetic controls generally, see HAAR & WOLF, supra note 59, at 518-44;
MANDELKER, supra note 125, §§ 11.01-.34; Norman Williams, Scenic Protection as a
Legitimate Goal of Public Regulation, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTENP. L. 3 (1990).
For an example of the traditional rejection of aesthetic-based nuisances, see Woodstock
Burial Ground Ass'n v. Hager, 35 A. 431, 432 (Vt. 1896).
The law will not declare a thing a nuisance because it is unsightly and disfigured, nor
because it is not in a proper and suitable condition, nor because it is unpleasant to
the eye, and a violation of the rules of propriety and good taste, nor because the
property of another is rendered less valuable. No fanciful notions are recognized.
The law does not cater to men's tastes, nor consult their convenience merely.
Id. See also Whitmore v. Brown, 65 A. 516, 521 (Me. 1906).
The law of this state does not recognize any legal right to an unobstructed view of
scenery over and across the lands, even the flats, of others unless acquired by grant,
nor does the law recognize as a cause of action the annoyance caused by the
proximity or ugliness of otherwise harmless structures upon the land of another.
Id. But cf Raymond R. Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional
Judicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 (1987); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging
Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1970).
See also Hart, supra note 323, at 1296 (footnote omitted) ("Colonial laws authorized
city officials to ensure that new buildings met criteria of order, uniformity, or gracefulness
in their design and placement, or required that buildings be maintained 'in a comly
way.').
334. See, e.g., Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d 1346, 1350 (Mass. 1980)
("We hold that a municipality may impose reasonable time limitations on development,
at least where those restrictions are temporary and adopted to provide controlled
development while the municipality engages in comprehensive planning studies."); HAAR
& WOLF, supra note 59, at 518 ("One of the most striking departures from 'established
principles' that land-use lav has taken of late is the patent acknowledgment of aesthetics
as a legitimate goal of the state's police power, either independently or as part of the
amorphous concept labeled 'general welfare."'); MANDELKER, supra note 125, § 11.05, at
460-61 ("A clear majority of courts hold that aesthetics alone is a legitimate govemmental
purpose in land use regulation.... [This view] ... resolves the substantive due process
problem raised by facial attacks on aesthetic controls.") (footnotes omitted).
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as applied these schemes raise serious takings concerns. 35 Many states
and localities have responded to this problem by providing safety nets for
landowners who are negatively affected by these schemes. These safety
nets take the form of transferable development rights, 336 conservation
easements, 337 and incentive zoning.338  After Lucas, government
officials run a special risk of an adverse takings holding if they do not
have such "compensatory" tools and they are engaged in regulation that
strays too far from its Euclidean and private-nuisance roots.
Dolan, Lucas, and Nollan demonstrate that judicial deference
becomes much more problematic when local regulators enter the
environmental harm abatement fray and when their state and regional
counterparts act without the significant administrative protections and
scientific expertise that characterize comprehensive, harm-based
environmental regulation. Such a chilling effect on some public actors
is not altogether unwelcome, however, given the potential conflict
between the legitimate planning and ecological aims of land-use controls
and other societal goals. Such societal goals include the elimination of
discrimination,339 the reduction of local government corruption,"4 the
widespread availability of affordable housing,34' and the encouragement
335. See, e.g., John M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the
Growth Management Act, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1259 (1993); Pelham, supra note
39; Michael A. Duddy, Comment, Taking it Too Far: Growth Management and the Limits
to Land-Use Regulation in Maine, 44 ME. L. REV. 99 (1992). Penn Central and Nollan
are the two most prominent examples of as-applied takings challenges to aesthetic-based
regulations.
336. See supra note 244 for materials on transferable development rights.
337. See Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through
Preemptive Federal Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 406-12 (1993);
Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REv. 433, 435-40 (1984).
338. See John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation
of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for
Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and
Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991).
339. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. The lead party in the Mount
Laurel litigation was the Southern Burlington County, New Jersey chapter of the NAACP.
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
340. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
34 1. For an excellent review of the literature linking land-use controls and housing
costs, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do GROWTH CONTROLS MATTER? A REVIEW OF
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAND USE REGULATIONS (1990). See also ADVISORY COMM'N ON REG. BARRIERS TO
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of socioeconomic integration.342 When, however, the legal and politi-
cal protections are in place, the judicial role is much more circumspect,
as in Keystone-the case that is much more than Pennsylvania Coal
"revisited. 343
VII. A MATTER OF DIFFERENCE-DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER
As with their nuisance precursors, land-use planning and environ-
mental law are confused in practice and in legal analysis. Local
governments are becoming increasingly active in the regulation and
control of the environmental impact of activities that occur within their
borders.3" Most often, this local regulation is in accordance with
AFFORDABLE HOUSING, "NOT IN MY BACK YARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING: REPORT TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY KEMP (1991);
William A. Fischel, Exclusionary Zoning and Growth Controls: A Comment on the APA's
Endorsement of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 65, 66(1991) ("The more recent studies indicate that suburban zoning and land use controls raise
the cost of housing for everyone, not just the poor.").
342. See supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text. See also Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v.
Mayor of Washington, 379 A.2d 6, 31 (N.J. 1977) (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice
Pashman regretfully writes:
State regulation embodied in the zoning power deeply affects the racial, economic,
and social structure of our society, and locks people into an environment over which
they have no control. Generations of children are relegated to a slum schooling and
playing in the overcrowded and congested streets of the inner cities. Men and
women seeking to earn a living for themselves and their families are barred by
distance from job markets. Society as a whole suffers the failure to solve the
economic and social problems which exclusionary zoning creates; we live daily with
the failure of our democratic institutions to eradicate class distinctions. Inevitably,
the dream of a pluralistic society begins to fade.
Id.
343. Derek Guemmer, Casenote, Constitutional Law: Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis: Pennsylvania Coal Revisited, 56 UMKC L. REV. 153 (1987);
Susan M. McMichael, Note, Mahon Revisited: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1067 (1989).
344. See Michael F. Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental
Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 33 (1989). See also Tarlock,
supra note 323, at 560. Professor Tarlock writes:
Current local government efforts to protect biodiversity are an extension of the
suburban growth control movement, but there are crucial philosophical differences.
Biodiversity protection is not a Romantic effort to create the illusion of a prior Eden,
but is a highly rational effort to apply modem science to prevent further harmful
reductions in high quality habitats and the species that they support. Scientific
biodiversity protection is ultimately not based on immutable values, but on the
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federal and state standards and mandates. 45  Indeed, many federal
environmental laws encourage state and local experimentation, as long
as minimal safety standards are not violated.346
Local governments are also striking out on their own without federal
and state mandates. They now place heavy emphasis on ecological
criteria in making their zoning and planning decisions,347 provide for
conservation and preservation through their growth management
programs,34 restrict development that has a negative impact on visual
access,349 and outlaw real estate development activities that are deemed
constant interplay between theory and practice, and thus is subject to constant
modification as new information is acquired.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
345. See MALONE, supra note 212, § 1.01, at 1-2. Professor Malone notes:
By the late 1970s, a well-worn pattern for environmental regulation had been set.
If an environmental problem could be addressed through imposition of technological
standards, Congress would mandate that approach. For environmental problems
which seemingly had to be addressed through land use controls, such as preservation
of floodplains and coastal zones, federal standards would set criteria for voluntary
state and local land use programs, with the incentive of federal funding for qualifying
programs.
A new era of environmental regulation was ushered in with the 1980s .... The
Reagan administration emphasized an expanded role for state and local governments
while decreasing federal funding for state and local environmental programs.
[In the 1980s] Congress created a new land use control program for nonpoint source
pollution. It did so, however, with its usual temerity, leaving formulation of land use
controls to state and local governments.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
346. See, e.g., CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); CAA § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416
(1994); and CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994).
347. See, e.g., LANE KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING (1980); Luther L. McDougal,
III, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47 TUL. L. REV.
255 (1973); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 363
(1991).
348. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.010 (West 1991) ("[U]ncoordinated
and unplanned growth, together with a lack of common goals expressing the public's
interest in the conservation and the wise use of our lands, pose a threat to the environment,
sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high quality of life enjoyed
by residents of this state."). See also supra note 332.
349. See Williams, supra note 333, at 8-19. Professor Williams notes that "[a] number
of important cases, arising out of the environmental movement, have explicitly approved
the use of various public regulatory powers in order to protect specific scenic values." Id.
at 8.
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dangerous to human and nonhuman life."' °
Similarly, federal and state lawmakers over the last few decades
have entered the land-use planning arena with increasing frequency.
Congress requires bureaucrats who manage federal lands to produce and
follow detailed land-use plans.35" ' The federal government has provided
seed money to states and localities through the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act352 so that well-balanced and effective land-use plans can be
developed for coastal areas. 53 Additionally, federal controls on criteria
air pollutants have had a direct impact on the commuting patterns to and
from central cities and an indirect impact on local planning deci-
sions.354  Since the "quiet revolution" that began in the 1970s,3"
even more states have taken up planning approval functions either
statewide or in areas deemed environmentally sensitive. 56  Some
states, feeling the pressure from federal waste treatment and disposal
legislation, 57 have intervened in local planning decisions that concern
350. See MALONE, supra note 212, § 1.02. Professor Malone writes:
Local governments have aggressively become involved in regulation to equalize the
burdens from environmental risks, for example, enacting right-to-know ordinances
requiring disclosure of risks from hazardous waste and land use ordinances to
regulate (or prohibit) hazardous waste facilities contaminating groundwater within
theirjurisdiction. Despite fears of local protectionism, local environmental regulation
has proliferated to fill in the gaps of federal environmental regulation, most notably
through the mechanism of land use regulation so ardently avoided at the federal level.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
351. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 202(a), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1712(a) (1994) ("The [Interior] Secretary shall, with public involvement and consistent
with the terms and conditions of this Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise
land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands.").
352. CZMA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1994).
353. See Michael Allan Wolf, Accommodating Tensions in the Coastal Zone: An
Introduction and Overview, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7 (1985); Malone, supra note 214.
354. See Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth
Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America's Major Quality of Life
Crisis, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 915 (1991). See also CAA § 182(d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 751 la(d)(1)(B) (1994); Leanne Cusumano, Student Article, Analysis of the 1990 Clean
Air Act's Employee Commute Options Program: A Trip Down the Right Road, 18 WM.
& MARY J. ENvTL. L. 175 (1993).
355. The term derives from BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 272.
356. See supra note 271.
357. E.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
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the siting of treatment and disposal sites." 8 Other states have brought
local zoning and planning decisions under the umbrella of state
environmental policy acts.359
Unfortunately, overlapping land-use and environmental controls are
perceived by landowners, developers, and builders (and the trade and
advocacy groups that represent their interests in legislatures and
courthouses) as burdensome and intrusive. 36° Moreover, judges faced
with challenges to modem, hybrid, land-use restrictions cannot help but
be confused by questions of due deference and applicable levels of
scrutiny, preemption, and the appropriateness and measure of compensa-
tion for confiscatory regulation.
358. See, e.g., Bruce J. Parker & John H. Turner, Overcoming Obstacles to the Siting
of Solid Waste Management Facilities, 21 N.M. L. REV. 91 (1990). See also supra note
221.
359. See Stewart E. Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Process: New
York's Experience with SEQRA, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 2041, 2042-43 (1992). Sterk notes:
In many states, the EIS [environmental impact statement] requirement applies only
to those projects that are undertaken or funded by the state. Other states, including
New York and California, require impact statements not only for
government-sponsored projects, but also for projects which require government
permits, and extend the EIS requirement beyond state actions to actions taken by
municipalities. Applying the EIS requirement to any private development that
requires municipal approval--including a special permit, a zoning amendment, or a
variance--obviously affects the development process to a significantly greater degree
than would a little NEPA limited to actions undertaken by state agencies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
360. Indeed, the concern over the deprivation of cherished rights has given rise to a
multi-front "property rights movement." See H. Jane Lehman, Private Property Rights
Proponents Gain Ground; Coalition Against Land-Use Laws Takes on Environmentalists,
Scores Wins in Congress and Courts, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at El. Lehman writes:
In a surprising show of strength, the private property rights movement has racked
up a string of recent victories in Congress and in the courts.
The visible progress comes four years since the property rights crusade began to
coalesce, yet remains far short of the influence wielded by what the activists consider
their chief nemesis-the environmental community.
At its core, the property rights coalition is railing against land-use laws,
particularly those protecting wetlands and endangered species, that it claims rob
property owners of the full use and value of their land.
Id See also John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of
Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); Richard Miniter, You Just Can't Take it Anymore:
America's Property Rights Movement, Heritage Foundation Policy Review, Fall 1994, at
40; Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash
Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVT'L L.J. 637 (1995).
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The current state of the law of public and private nuisance is
hopelessly confused;36 regretfully, we can see similar confusion in
their modem legacies. Four major problems exist with the
"environmentalization" of land-use planning.362
First, because there is no barrier separating land-use planning from
environmental regulation, local officials often operate in a realm in which
they have little expertise and even less control over negative
externalities.363 The spillover effects are greater, the public health and
private property stakes are higher, and the opportunities for abuse (for
example, cloaking discrimination or outright confiscation of private lands
for public use) are greater in the absence of administrative law
protections, interest group give-and-take, and technical expertise.
Second, neoLochnerian judges can use the corruption, haphazard-
ness, and prejudice frequently associated with local land-use planning
and zoning to rationalize greater activism in the area of environmental
regulation-at local, state, and federal levels. It is too tempting for
judges who believe strongly in the protection of private property rights
to jump on the anti-environmental bandwagon that, over the past few
years, has picked up increasing political and legal support.3" In other
words, confusing the two realms of regulation of the use and abuse of
361. See supra note 150.
362. Beginning in the 1970s, a growing number of commentators have explored the
implications of the various intersections of environmental law and "traditional" land-use
planning. See, e.g., BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 272; DANIEL R. MANDELKER,
ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (198 1). See also MODEL LAND
DEV. CODE Commentary on Article 7 (1975).
363. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 360. The most likely candidate would appear to be Justice Scalia,
who, during the oral argument in Dolan, engaged in the following attempted argument
reductio ad absurdum:
[Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler stated that] what this Court said in
Nollan is that it agreed with the State's contention there that if the permit condition
serves the same purpose as an outright denial would have done, that ... the
condition can be imposed. That's all the Court required.
QUESTION [Scalia]: Is that all ... that Notian said, for--suppose the City is
worried about urban congestion and pollution and someone who has a factory wants
to ... expand it infinitesimally, just a very little bit. Can the State require, as a
condition of that permit, a million-dollar contribution to the City, which would go to
,.. pollution reduction?
Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 45,
Dolan (No. 93-518).
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land invites judicial activism by some conservative judges, bringing to
the fore the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" that has constantly plagued
the American judiciary. 65
Third, the state of takings jurisprudence was already confused before
Dolan and before the activism that cases such as Nollan and Lucas
inspired in the state and lower federal courts.3" Over the past decade,
365. The classic formulation of the counter-majoritarian difficulty is found in
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962). Bickel writes:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system.... [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or
the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing
majority, but against it.
Id. See also David R. Dow, Constitutional Midrash: The Rabbis' Solution to Professor
Bickel's Problem, 29 HOUs. L. REv. 543 (1992). Dow notes:
A generation ago Alexander Bickel described the Supreme Court as a deviant
institution, and constitutional theorists have been attempting ever since to provide a
satisfactory normative defense of judicial review. The problem, of course, which
Professor Bickel called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," is that when the
Supreme Court declares an act of a legislature unconstitutional, it is presumably
thwarting majority will. In a legal culture where the norm of majoritarianism
prevails, such judicial action appears problematic.
Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). Friedman adds:
We have been haunted by the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" far too long. At
least since Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch, constitutional scholars
have been preoccupied, indeed one might say obsessed, by the perceived necessity
of legitimizing judicial review. The endeavor has consumed the academy and, as this
article will argue, distracted us from recognizing and studying the constitutional
system that we do enjoy.
Id. at 578 (footnotes omitted).
366. In the months following the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas, many state and
federal courts cited the case in takings challenges. In the following cases, courts cited
Lucas and refused to find a taking: Matagorda County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir.
1994) (foreclosure of tax lien without awarding taxing units recovery against FDIC for
amount secured by lien); Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1071-72
(Fed. Cir.) (Comptroller of Currency's declaration that bank was insolvent and appointment
of FDIC as receiver), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994); Parkridge Investors Ltd.
Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192, 1199 (8th Cir.) (FMHA refusal to
alter loan repayment procedures), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2163 (1994); Tabb Lakes, Ltd.
v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Corps of Engineers order to suspend
construction activities until permit granted); Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d
604,617-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordinances restricting billboard placement); Washington Legal
Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 975 (1st Cir. 1993) (state Interest on
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Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program); McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts,
989 F.2d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1993) (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) provision preventing lessor from terminating lease with bank
in receivership); McMurray v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 36, 41-42 (Ist Cir. 1993) (tax
court's refusal to allow charitable deduction for donation of bog-land); Pinnock v.
International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574, 587-88 (S.D. Cal. 1993)
(compliance with Americans With Disabilities Act provisions); Small Landowners of Oahu
v. City of Honolulu, 832 F. Supp. 1404, 1409-10 (D. Haw. 1993) (ordinance providing
mechanism for transfer of fee simple interests of leasehold property from condominium
lessors to lessees); Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Soc'y v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp.
766, 776 (D. Haw. 1993) (regulations on anchoring and mooring in state waters), aff d, 42
F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1994); Rivervale Realty Co. v. Town of Orangetown, 816 F. Supp.
937, 943, 947-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (zoning change from one- to two-acre residential lots);
Szymkowicz v. District of Columbia, 814 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D.D.C. 1993) (repeated
ticketing of parked cars); Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992)
(Corps of Engineers denial of permit to dredge and fill wetlands and refusal of mitigation
proposal); Bums Harbor Fish Co. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Ind. 1992)
(ordinance banning gill net fishing); Berrios v. City of Lancaster, 798 F. Supp. 1153,
1157-58 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (condemnation of leased property); Cannone v. Noey, 867 P.2d
797, 800-01 (Alaska 1994) (state environmental agency's rejection of subdivision plans);
Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993) (municipality's purchase of
parkland, refusal to approve water and sewer districts, and decision not to participate in
road improvement district); Zerbetz v. Municipality of Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777, 782 n.5,
783 (Alaska 1993) (designation of property as "conservation wetlands"); Tahoe Keys
Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 742-
46 (Cal. Ct. App.) (refusal to'enjoin challenged regulation conditioning building permits
on payment of mitigation fee prior to trial of takings issue), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485
(1994); Ramona Convent of the Holy Names v. City of Alhambra, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140,
146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (rezoning residentially zoned school properties as "open space"
areas), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 315, 316 (1994); Ehrlich v. City of Culver, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d 468, 474-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (development conditioned upon payment of fees),
cert. denied and judgment vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994); City of San Francisco v.
Golden Gate Heights Inv., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 468-69 (Cal. Ct. App.) (valuation of five
out of fourteen lots of condemned property), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 338 (1993); Tensor
Group v. City of Glendale, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (ordinance
limiting commercial development in multiresidential zones); The Mill v. Colorado Dep't
of Health, 887 P.2d 993, 999, 1001-02 (Colo. 1994) (cancellation of uranium-contaminated
mill lease); City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 178 (Colo.) (en banc) (city's
acquisition of surface estate, drilling to survey, and final determination of no exploitable
coal reserves), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 63 (1993); Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of
Hinsdale, 617 N.E.2d 1227, 1243-44 (Il. App. Ct.) (rezoning lot to increase minimum size
for development), cert. denied, 622 N.E.2d 1229 (II1. 1993); Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa
City, 492 N.W.2d 659, 664-66 (Iowa 1992) (ordinance preventing construction from
penetrating specified zone surrounding municipal airport), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2343
(1993); Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 288-89 (Ky. 1993) (injunction of surface
mining activities), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1218 (1994); Offen v. County Council, 625
A.2d 424, 433-39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (denial of sewer upgrade permit and
subsequent rezoning of property to preclude commercial development), revd' on other
grounds, 639 A.2d 1070 (Md. 1994); Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 N.E.2d 1269,
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1273-74 (Mass. 1992) (city rent control board's refusal to allow sale of property), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2338 (1993); Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492
N.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (two-year moratorium on development of land
zoned for commercial use), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2929 (1993); Kudloff v. City of
Billings, 860 P.2d 140, 142-44 (Mont. 1993) (annexation of property); Bamford v. Upper
Republican Natural Resources Dist., 512 N.W.2d 642, 652 (Neb.) (moratorium on
withdrawing water from wells), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 201 (1994); Kelly v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1033-34 (Nev. 1993) (denial of permits to
construct single-family homes based on water safety and soil conservation criteria), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 684 (1994); Smith v. Town of Wolfeboro, 615 A.2d 1252, 1257 (N.H.
1992) (planning board's reconfiguration that prevented residential use of lot); In re "Plan
for Orderly Withdrawal from New Jersey" of Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 609 A.2d 1248,
1262-64 (N.J. 1992) (State Insurance Commission requirement that affiliates of insurer
forfeit licenses upon insurer's withdrawal from market), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066
(1993); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1385-87
(N.J. 1992) (ordinance imposing licensing requirements for quarry operations and limiting
depth to which land could be quarried); Patzau v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 638 A.2d
866, 871-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (restrictions on development in "airport safety
zones"), cert. denied, 649 A.2d 1288 (1994); Town of Clarkstown v. C&A Carbone, Inc.,
587 N.Y.S.2d 681, 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (ordinance mandating all solid waste in
county be handled at designated facility), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1679 (1994);
Guilford County Dep't of Emergency Servs. v. Seaboard Chem. Corp., 441 S.E.2d 177,
183 (N.C. Ct. App.) (county ordinance prohibiting storage of hazardous waste in county),
review denied, 447 S.E.2d 390 (N.C. 1994); Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union
Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 613 N.E.2d 580, 584-85 (Ohio 1993) (denial of
conditional use permit); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 452-57 (Or.
1993) (en banc) (denial of permit to build seawall), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994);
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 634 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (conviction for
building 95-foot tall commercial sign penetrating airport airspace); Mock v. Department
of Envtl. Resources, 623 A.2d 940, 945-47 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (denial of permit to
fill wetlands); Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23, 33-35 (Wash. 1993)
(requirement that apartment building owners pay registration fee); Jones v. King County,
874 P.2d 853, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (rezoning commercial property for residential
use); McFillan v. Berkeley County Planning Comm'n, 438 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 1993)
(refusal to allow expansion of mobile home park without committee approval).
In the following cases, courts paid homage to Lucas and accepted takings arguments:
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1178-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Corps
of Engineers prohibiting construction on wetlands); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269,
1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act restricting
former President's access to presidential papers); Peters v. Milks Grove Special Drainage
Dist. No. 1, 610 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 (111. App. Ct.) (expansion of drainage ditch easement),
cert. denied, 622 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1993); Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515
N.W.2d 401, 407 (Neb. 1994) (denial of use permit to operate convenience store);
Moroney v. Mayor of Old Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045, 1050 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(denial of hardship variance from zoning requirements), cert. denied, 642 A.2d 1004 (N.J.
1994); Ferguson v. City of Mill City, 852 P.2d 205,207-08 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (ordinance
requiring dedication of easement for sewer connection).
See also Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631-32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (government
blocked wetlands reclamation project; temporary takings claim barred by statute of
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the United States Court of Federal Claims has been an especially active
battleground in the struggle between regulators and aggrieved landown-
ers, resulting in an internally inconsistent and troubling body of case
law.367 The combination of Scalia's incantation of nuisance law and
limitations and permanent takings case remanded); Orange Lake Assocs. v. Kirkpatrick,
21 F.3d 1214, 1225 (2d Cir. 1994) (reducing number of residential units allowed on
property; not a takings challenge); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Corps of Engineers' denial of permit to mine beneath
wetlands; lower court decision vacated so that court could balance public and private
interests), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of
Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549 (11th Cir.) (zoning commission's reinterpretation of
ordinance that resulted in premature expiration of zoning designation), vacated en banc,
42 F.3d 626 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232-33
(9th Cir.) (water moratorium alleged to be substantive due process and equal protection
violations), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 193 (1994); Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States,
6 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Navy's seizure of warehouse effecting physical
occupation); Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 92-93, 98, 105-06 (2d Cir.
1992) (denial of permit to develop single-family homes; takings claim not ripe), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993); Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1134 (11th Cir.
1992) (county designation of property as resource protection area; remanded because
magistrate judge misapplied takings law); Carpenter v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
804 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 n.1 (D. Nev. 1992) (authority's 8-month moratorium on new
construction banning single family residential use; landowner's as-applied takings
challenge survived summary judgment); In Re Gingerella, 148 B.R. 157, 160 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1992) (show cause order to FMHA to justify its refusal to allow conversion of
rental units to condominiums before final determination of takings issue); Healing v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 765-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (remanded
to trial court to determine whether failure to approve development in coastal zone was a
taking); Carter v. City of Porterville, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76, 79-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(remanded to determine extent of remaining use from construction of dam); People ex rel.
Dep't of Transp. v. Diversified Properties Co. III, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 680 n.3 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) ("de facto taking" prior to eminent domain action); Layne v. City of
Mandeville, 633 So. 2d 608, 610-612 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (remanded from summary
judgment decision holding rezoning of commercial property for residential use not a
taking), cert. denied, 635 So. 2d 234 (La. 1994); Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d
1312, 1313-16 (Mass. 1994) (remanded to Land Court for determination of whether
designation of minimum elevation required to build in wetlands was a taking in light of
Lucas); Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 5-11 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (requirement that
owners of mobile home parks being closed help defray tenants' relocation expenses
effected due process violation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1216 (1994); Powers v. Skagit
County, 835 P.2d 230, 232-38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (court remanded case to determine
whether denial of permit to build in floodway was a taking).
367. Compare Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (Cl. Ct. 1992)
(holding cease and desist order issued to landowner who filled wetlands without permit
was not regulatory taking requiring compensation), affd, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) with
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (landowner denied
permit to fill wetlands entitled to compensation for taking), affd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
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Rehnquist's rethinking of judicial deference promises to make a
perplexing body of law even more puzzling. 68 Statutes that attempt
to "strengthen" private property protections-either substantively369 or
procedurally 37 -promise to complicate the matter even further.37" '
1994). See also Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the
United States Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens that in Fairness and Equity Ought to
Be Borne by Society as a Whole, 40 CAT. U. L. RV. 549 (1991); George W. Miller &
Jonathan L. Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court of Federal Claims and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 863 (1993); Wolf,
supra note 22, at 504-10; Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The United
States Claims Court's New Analysis of Section 404 Takings Challenges, 19 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 317 (1991); Patrick Kennedy, Comment, The United States Claims Court:
A Safe "Harbor" from Government Regulation of Privately Owned Wetlands, 9 PACE
ENvTL. L. REV. 723 (1992); Timothy G. Warner, Note, Recent Decisions by the United
States Claims Court and the Need for Greater Supreme Court Direction in Wetlands
Takings Cases, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 901 (1992); Seth E. Zuckerman, Note, Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States: The Claims Court Takes a Wrong Turn-Toward a Higher
Standard of Review, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 753 (1991).
368. Three days after announcing its decision in Dolan, the Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari in a new regulatory takings case. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994) (Mem.). The case was remanded to the Court of Appeal for further
consideration in the light of Dolan. 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (Mem.). The state court had
rejected the landowner's challenge to the city's
imposition of two fees on a developer by a municipality as conditions of approval of
a development project: (I) a $280,000 fee to mitigate the impact of a land-use
change (the mitigation fee); and (2) a $33,220 fee in lieu of a requirement that art be
placed on the development project (the in lieu art fee).
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. See also Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)
(court applied rough proportionality test to monetary exactions).
369. In his introduction to proposed takings statutes, Professor Martinez, supra note
360, includes two "substantive" varieties--"Extreme Substantive Models" and "Moderate
Substantive Models." Id. at 336. He designates as "Extreme Substantive Models" those
proposals that "go beyond federal and state takings case law and provide that any
regulatory program that reduces the fair market value (FMV) of property to less than fifty
percent for the uses permitted at the time the owner acquired title to the property shall be
deemed to have been taken for the use of the public." Id. at 337. As an example of a
"Moderate Substantive" proposal, he sites "an Oregon bill [that] provides that any
restriction which reduces FMV is compensable if it interferes with the distinct,
investment-backed expectations of the owner, but the amount of compensation may be
reduced to the extent the owner receives economic benefits from similar restrictions on
other property." Id. (citing Or. H.B. 2899, 67th Leg., 1993 Regular Sess. § 4).
370. See Martinez, supra note 360, at 336 ("Procedural Models require governmental
agencies to conduct 'takings impact assessments' (TIAs) before adopting regulations or
applying such regulations to specific situations. The TIAs are generally required to apply
existing state and federal takings case law.") (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted).
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Fourth, decisionmaking in private real estate markets is frustrated
because of the ambiguities of takings law and the merging of land-use
planning and environmental law tools and analysis. Because investment
decisions are so dependent on the current availability of affordable
capital,372 and are so closely tied to shifting national and local housing
and economic development trends,373 this sector of the economy would
371. Consider the intricacies of Utah's Private Property Protection Act, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to -4 (Supp. 1995). Section 63-90-4 mandates, in part, the following
process for takings analysis of agency actions:
(1) Using the guidelines prepared under Section 63-90-3, each state agency shall:
(a) determine whether an action has constitutional taking implications; and
(b) prepare an assessment of constitutional taking implications that includes an
analysis of the following:
(i) the likelihood that the action may result in a constitutional taking, including
a description of how the taking affects the use or value of private property;
(ii) alternatives to the proposed action that may:
(A) fulfill the government's legal obligations of the state agency;
(B) reduce the impact on the private property owner, and
(C) reduce the risk of a constitutional taking; and
(iii) an estimate of financial cost to the state for compensation and the source
of payment within the agency's budget if a constitutional taking is determined.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-90-4 (Supp. 1995). See also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida's
Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 315 (1995).
372. See Barbara Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelnan,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697 (1988). Professor Rose-Ackerman writes:
The shifting doctrines of takings law introduce an element of uncertainty into
investors' choices that has nothing to do with the underlying economics of the
situation. This uncertainty creates two problems. First, investors do not know
whether or not damages will be paid. Second, in the event damages are not paid,
investors will be left bearing the cost of an uninsurable risk. Thus, the Justices need
to recognize that the investment-backed expectations they discuss are themselves
affected by the nature of takings law. To the extent that investors are risk averse, the
very incoherence of the doctrine produces inefficient choices. When legal rules affect
behavior, clarity is a value in itself, independent of the actual content of the rule.
Id. at 1700 (footnote omitted).
373. Chief Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals, who authored the
opinion invalidating the TDR scheme in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), offered the following
example of real estate market volatility:
In the Fred F. French case, the owner at one point had been offered a tremendous
price for those development rights somewhere else in mid-Manhattan. But by the
time the case was decided, mid-Manhattan was terribly overbuilt and the value of the
TDRs had dropped. That really isn't an accidental circumstance. This is the nature
of our economy.
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often choose a negative answer today over a "maybe" that drags on for
years. Developers put a premium on predictability when it comes to
regulatory schemes because multiple layers of environmental regulation
can prolong the already protracted period between land assembly and
construction.374
It is much too late to call for the segregation of land-use planning
and environmental regulation, in theory and in practice. It may be
noncontroversial to assert that planning and zoning are designed to
function as preemptive tools to separate discordant land uses, to enhance
and maintain real property values for the community as a whole, and to
accommodate growth and change when and where they are needed.
Similarly, we can appreciate that lawmakers often intend modem, federal
environmental statutes to serve as reactive controls designed to ensure
that human life and health are protected from a wide range of harms.
However, the proliferation of hybrid and duplicative regulations and the
discomfort with the kind of hairsplitting found in Granite Rock illustrate
the difficulty involved in drawing meaningful distinctions in practice.37
Rather than devoting our energies either to develop workable
distinctions between land-use planning and environmental law or to
curtail the process of commingling the two, we should instead begin to
Charles D. Breitel, A Judicial View of Transferable Development Rights, 30 LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG., Feb. 1978, at 5, 6.
374. For especially protracted pre-construction delays, some attributable in part to the
landowners, see Healing v. California Coastal Comm'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 760 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) ("In 1977, Kenneth E. Healing purchased a 2.5 acre lot in the Santa
Monica Mountains, overlooking Tuna Canyon and the Pacific Ocean. What he had in
mind was building a modest, three-bedroom home for his family. What he got was a long-
term nightmare."); City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So. 2d 1377,
1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (landowner alleged that "[c]ity officials had willfully obstructed
construction on the east side from at least 1974 though [sic] 1981; that after 1981, the City
harassed Yardarm continually; and that Yardarm repeatedly tried to obtain financing for
the entire property from 1981 through 1985 but could not do so"), review denied, 651 So.
2d 1197 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2583 (1994); County Council v. Offen, 639 A.2d
1070, 1071 (Md. 1994) ("The facts giving rise to the present controversy date back almost
three decades."); Schwartz v. City of Flint, 466 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Mich. CL App. 1991)
("This action is part of a continuing legal saga that began in 1971 when plaintiff, desiring
to erect townhouses and apartment buildings on his property, first instituted a suit claiming
that defendant's single-family residential zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied
to his land."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562 (1992).
375. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text. See also Malone, supra note
214, at 772 ("The problem simply put is that there is no talismanic distinction between
environmental and land use regulation with respect to preservation of critical environmen-
tal resources such as wetlands, coastal zones, and floodplains.").
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
86 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
address the challenges posed by this admixture. First, in order to address
the expertise gap, federal and state governments need to provide local
regulators with the level of funding needed to develop, implement, and
enforce meaningful, effective, and efficient environmental regulations.
The two prevailing alternatives-benign neglect on the one hand and
unfunded mandates on the other-have proven unworkable and unfair to
public and private actors.376
Fortunately, we already have some useful models of environmental
federalism, such as the Coastal Zone Mangement Act and the Federal
Noise Control Act, although there is significant room for improve-
ment.377 Inadequate funding that results in real or perceived regulatory
376. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the
Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1355 (1993). Zelinsky notes:
Few contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as intensely as
unfunded mandates. Mayors, county executives, city councilmen, and the
professional associations representing them routinely argue that the federal and state
governments have, in recent years, imposed at an accelerating rate expensive require-
ments on municipalities without granting corresponding funds for compliance, thereby
irresponsibly straining the fiscal capacity of municipalities, hampering their ability
to provide essential services, and improperly infringing upon the scope of local
control. The complaints of municipal policymakers have provoked a variety of
proposals for restraining unfunded mandates: obligatory disclosure of the projected
costs of proposed mandates, requirements of legislative supermajorities for unfunded
mandates, and statutory and constitutional reimbursement arrangements for state-
imposed obligations on local governments.
Id. at 1356 (footnote omitted). Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1995)). See also Executive
Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) ("Enhancing
the Intergovernmental Partnership"); Congressman Paul Gillmor & Fred Eames,
Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded
Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 395 (1994) ("These unfunded mandates not only
are helping to push many governments to perilous financial footing, but also are unduly
enlarging the sphere of congressional dominion.") (footnote omitted).
377. See Malone, supra note 214, at 773. Professor Malone writes:
Renewed commitment to the CZMA is particularly crucial in the near future....
Management of the coastal zone necessitates federal cooperation in addressing issues
such as ocean incineration and dumping, ocean mining, and extended fishing rights.
Coastal protection is on the verge of slipping into a sea of budget cuts and political
battles over state and federal power that ignore the deficiencies of the Act itself.
Without a renewed commitment to coastal regulation, what progress has been made
in the delicate balance of state and federal cooperation and coastal development and
preservation will be irreparably destroyed.
Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 217, at 3. Shapiro writes:
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incompetence will inevitably lead to continued conflicts between
disgruntled landowners and local regulators who may not be able to meet
the requisite standard, be it "reasonable relationship," "rough propor-
tionality," or "substantial nexus."
Second, academic and government lawyers need to do a better job
of educating the judiciary with respect to the nature of modem, post-
Euclidean land-use planning. Many states and localities have responded
to concerns over corruption, arbitrariness, exclusion, parochialism, and
inefficiency by modifying-even overhauling-their planning and zoning
regimes.37 While these problems are by no means solved, we should
acknowledge the best efforts of those in the front lines of land-use
regulation, and encourage others to follow suit. Unfortunately, the
growing number of critics who seem content to engage in alarmism and
universal condemnation may have the judiciary's ear.
Third, in order to avoid muddying the regulatory takings waters
even more, all levels of government must build on their ongoing efforts
to ensure that regulations affecting the use of property (1) will not result
in deprivation of total value, (2) do not force the owner to choose
between enhancing the property's value and losing the right to exclude
others (including, most importantly, the right to exclude the general
public), and (3) are directly tied to the wide range of legitimate
governmental interests. To do otherwise would provide activist judges
with the opportunity to expand the reach of the Takings Clause even
further by (I) embracing conceptual severance,379 (2) broadening the
EPA's assertion that a federal noise abatement program was unnecessary has turned
out to be wrong on two grounds. First, EPA's support of an infrastructure for state
and local noise programs lowered the costs of such programs and made them more
attractive to those jurisdictions. A federal infrastructure is more economical because
it provides economies of scale that no state or combination of states can obtain.
Second, it has become clear that some national regulatory activities are necessary to
prevent conflicting local regulations from increasing the cost of doing business for
companies operating in many jurisdictions. Federal activities are desirable to
facilitate coordination among national and international agencies engaged in noise
abatement activities.
Id.
378. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text; Wolf, supra note 120, at 269
("The judicial, legislative (at all strata), and administrative refinements-experimentation
in the best Brandeisian tradition-in many cases have made contemporary zoning much
more responsive, creative, and complex than its Progressive precursor.").
379. See supra notes 306-12 and accompanying text.
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sweep of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,38 or (3) spending
more time scrutinizing the motives and methods of regulators.38' The
last thing advocates, judges, and lawmakers need is even more confusion
when they are engaged in the delicate task of balancing private rights and
the public interest.
Academic lawyers and lawmakers who believe that there is no
reason yet to abandon the traditional deference accorded government
officials can provide great assistance to like-minded judges by emphasiz-
ing public nuisance antecedents for, and affinities with, modern
regulations designed to protect human life and provide a healthy
environment. 382  In some instances, statutory modifications may be in
order; in others, research into dusty volumes of English and early
American common law will turn up some useful gems.383
Finally, it is long past time that legislators face up to the real-world
implications of multiple layers of land-use and environmental regulation.
Already, in the areas of waste disposal facility siting and affordable
housing development, some states have played the preemption card in
response to recalcitrant localities that manipulate their zoning and
planning powers to frustrate the private sector and in the process defeat
the interests of the commonweal."
There is no reason to play that card, however, when coordination of
regulatory tools will suffice. Perhaps Lucas and Dolan will serve as a
wake-up call to state and local officials who have allowed the prolifera-
tion of redundant, conflicting, and overburdening regulations, resulting
too often in a bureaucratic nightmare for even the most environmentally
enlightened landowners and developers. The situation is not any less
frustrating on the federal level, a fact recognized by the current
380. See supra notes 46-48, 71-74 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
382. For some early explorations of the implications of Lucas's use of nuisance law,
see Stephen P. Chinn & Neil R. Shortlidge, Regulatory Takings After Lucas: The Missouri
Nuisance Exception, 50 J. Mo. B. 213 (1994); Stephen P. Chinn & Neil R. Shortlidge,
Regulatory Takings After Lucas: The Kansas Nuisance Exception, 62 J. KAN. B. ASS'N,
Oct. 1993, at 28; Jamee J. Patterson, California Land Use Regulation Post Lucas: The
History and Evolution of Nuisance and Public Property Laws Portend Little Impact in
California, 11 UCLA J. ENv'L. L. & POL'Y 175 (1993); Todd D. Brody, Comment,
Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: Is There Lifefor Environmental
Regulation After Lucas?, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 287 (1993).
383. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 323.
384. See supra notes 221, 273.
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administration in its proposals for organizing complex statutes and
regulations on an industry-wide rather than media-wide basis 85
Local officials must also contend with dramatically reduced federal
and state subsidies and electorates that often viscerally react against
attempts to hike local taxes.3 The judicial skepticism represented by
385. See, e.g., Common Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee;
Establishment, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,117 (1994):
The Administrator announced the creation of the Common Sense Initiative (CSI)
in November 1993. The Initiative reflects the Administration's commitment to
setting strong environmental standards while encouraging common sense, innovation,
and flexibility in how the standards are met. The goal is cleaner and cheaper
environmental protection for entire industries. The Administrator's objective in
establishing the CSI is to bring together federal, state, and local government
representatives, environmental and environmental justice leaders, industry representa-
tives, and other stakeholders to examine the full range of environmental requirements
affecting industry.
Id. See also EPA Region ! Reorganization to Shift Focus to Multimedia Pollution Control,
Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), Oct. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNANED
file.
In an attempt to better target its resources, the Environmental Protection Agency's
New England regional office plans to revise the way its [sic] looks at environmental
issues and interacts with government, industry, and the public.
The region's draft proposal calls for the agency to shift from addressing
environmental problems on the basis of a single medium to a more comprehensive
and coordinated approach ....
Id.
Cf John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. and California Sign Water Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1994, at A24. Cushman writes:
Califomia and the Federal Government signed an agreement today on how to
protect the water and the wildlife of the San Francisco Bay and its vast inland delta,
resolving stubborn conflicts that for years had divided the region's farmers, city
dwellers and conservationists.
Concluding a year of negotiations that had continued right up to a final
court-ordered deadline, the two sides produced a far-reaching pact and turned a
confrontation between a recalcitrant state and a determined Federal overseer into a
compromise embraced by all sides.
The agreement is intended to preserve a vast but ecologically fragile estuary that
holds the aquatic lifeblood of central California. If it succeeds in halting the
watershed's prolonged environmental decline, it may prove to be a notable
achievement in the Clinton Administration's effort to manage whole ecosystems
rather than regulate one industry and one species at a time.
ld.
386. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBAF4EZ, supra note 1, at 24 ("As the state-local tax
revolt gathered force during the middle and late 1970s, its most hated target was the
property tax, which surveys consistently show to be the least popular of all taxes.").
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Dolan should give pause to all American localities that have had to resort
to exactions, impact fees, cash proffers, and other pay-as-you-go devices
designed to make up revenue gaps. Perhaps the Dolan Court's sharp
disapproval of Tigard's exaction techniques will finally prompt states to
confront the financial bind faced by many localities that are striving on
their own, in good faith, to contend with the negative environmental,
externalities associated with widescale and piecemeal real estate
development.
It is easy to read the Court's opinions in Lucas and Dollan as
danger signals for all forms of land-use planning and environmental
regulation, as the harbingers of a new period of Lochnerian activism to
protect our cherished, though tarnished, private property rights." 7 But
there are as many signals that the Justices are not anxious to serve as a
"zoning board of appeals."388
It is just as easy to dismiss Lucas and Dolan as aberrations: After
all, how often will a regulation effect a total deprivation or fall outside
the bounds of "rough proportionality"? Unfortunately, the answer is "too
often," if a majority of the Court joins Chief Justice Rehnquist and
adopts conceptual severance and if state and lower federal courts follow
the Court's lead and second-guess the motives and practices of regula-
tors.
Lawmakers who follow the first (expansive) reading might react by
repealing existing controls and holding all new proposals to overly
burdensome standards of economic efficiency and risk assessment.
Those who endorse the second (restrictive) reading and conduct business
as usual run a greater risk of potential costly litigation.
Occupying the position between these extremes are legislators and
387. See supra notes 6-7.
388. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall writes:
I am in full agreement with the majority that zoning is a complex and important
function of the State. It may indeed be the most essential function performed by
local government, for it is one of the primary means by which we protect that
sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of life. I therefore continue to adhere
to the principle of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), that deference
should be given to governmental judgments concerning proper land-use allocation.
That deference is a principle which has served this Court well and which is necessary
for the continued development of effective zoning and land-use control mechanisms.
.. Our role is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals.
Id.
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administrators who will take this opportunity to consider the implications
of multiple layering of land-use controls and environmental regulations,
especially those controls that are attributable to the shortfalls in public
financing and technical expertise that are experienced by many local and
state governments. When they take such an inventory, public officials,
with the assistance of planners, lawyers, scientists, and real estate
professionals, can then direct their attention to alternative approaches
designed to reconcile discordant land uses and to shield the public from
existing and imminent harms 38 --once the domain of private and public
nuisance law, today the realm of their regulatory legacies.
389. See Tarlock, supra note 323. One of the most provocative ideas for making local
planning and zoning more effective to control environmental externalities is the use of
Geographic Information Systems. See Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead
Zones" and Toxic Death Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 782 (1992) ("GIS
involves a combination of computer mapping and data base analysis. A GIS program can
plot and simultaneously review multiple layers of spatial information.") (footnotes
omitted); Ohio Hazardous Substance Research Education and Management Institute,
University of Cincinnati, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE FACILITY SITES IN METROPOLITAN
REGIONS: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RISK ASSESSMENT, PLANNING AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (1993); EDINBURGH GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (GIS) SERVER
HOME PAGE, http://www.geo.ed.ac.uk/home/gishome.htm. The Dutch government has
been a leader in investigating and implementing "environmental zoning" programs. See
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment, The Netherlands, MINISTERIAL
MANUAL FOR A PROVISIONAL SYSTEM OF INTEGRAL ENVIRONMENTAL ZONING,
INTEGRALE MILIEU ZONERING (1990); MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, IEZ AND AMERICAN
INNER-CITY REDEVELOPMENT: A HELPFUL INTERSECTION OF LAND-USE PLANNING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994) (paper presented to International Symposium on Urban
Planning and Environment) (on file with author).
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